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ABSTRACT

The research problem is to examine Goethe's educational philos
ophy as identified through an analytical study of the character Werther
in Goethe's novel The Sufferings of Young Werther.
The purpose of this study is to reveal the epistemological
premises of the learning construct that are within the context of the
novel, and to derive from these premises specific learning principles
that* can be applied to educational theory.

Goethe's concepts of the

human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and growth are defined
and subsequently utilised as the skeletal frame from which to con
struct the working principles of his thought process.

By focusing on

Goethe's actual thinking and how he comes to know, the novel becomes
a means, or mode, with which to illustrate the epistemological func
tioning of his mind.
Within this short novel, the inherent potentiality for learn
ing theory is substantial.

Goethe was offering his reading public a

learning construct by means of the relationship he established with
himself and his literary creation.

The. nature of the relationship was

such that both he and his readers would be provided with a learning
methodology.

To determine the premises of the learning construct from

the medium of the novel and then to apply these premises to the formula
tion of specific learning principles becomes the means by which to iso
late the educational application of Goethe's epistemology.
vii

Six educational principles have evolved from Goethe's episte
mological premises as they were examined within the context, of the
novel.

These principles of learning are identified and their signifi

cance as a totality for learning theory is considered.
1.

Goethe realized that the subject matter of education is man,

and he emphasized the nature of man and his characteristics as a self
determiner.

The focus of education must therefore center upon the

learner and M s
2.

individuality.

Because the self is a unity and functions as a totality,

learning becomes an experience of each distinct, or unique, self.
Being a composite of the effects of its choices, the self perceives
learning as an extremely personal matter.
”’S

f

”

This means that education
I

must recognize the value that man places on his self in his demand
for self-cultivation.
3«

-

Goethe knew that the self can choose to educate itself and

actually proceed to bring this process about.

Through determining the

validity and reliability of that which it seeks to know, the learner is
provided with an empirical base from which to begin his instruction.
In this manner, the self becomes its own teacher and the learning act
is identified as a process of self-examination.
4.

It is the self that exerts its own inherent potentiality for

knowing and learning.

Goethe recognized the in, ernal, or intrinsic,

motivation of the self to seek knowledge and truth, and he demanded that
the self actively confront its learning object.

Education must acknowl

edge that the „ arner does indeed possess an i ner vitality of his own.

viii

5.

Man is always in relation to that which confronts him as a

determiner.

All learning is creative because the learner is the creator

of further learning.

In his role as creator, the learner cakes a multi

tude of decisions and must subsequently accept the inherent responsibil
ity for the choices made and their implications.

Goethe vis fully aware

that in actualizing its choices through application of their meanings,
the self becomes an active agent in the process of learning.
6.

In order to actively participate in the educational process,

the learner must understand the social nature of man.

a

relationship of

mutuality, based on dialogue and intercommunication, is a l a m i n g
process.

This process of learning is the application of knowledge in

quest of meaning in a social context.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem
The research problem is to examine Goethe's educational philos
ophy as identified through an analytical study of the character Werthe’
in Goethe's novel The Sufferings of Young Werther.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the epistemological
premises of the learning construct that are within the context of
Goethe's novel Werther, and to derive from these premises specific
learning principles that can be applied to educational theory.

Need for the Study
This study is needed in order to understand the educational
philosophy of Goethe, because neither an intensive nor extensive exam
ination of his theory of learning has as yet been done.

The episte

mological framework that Goethe constructed for the novel Werther was
the permanent structure upon which he built his literary corpus.

As

a result, Werther is the prototype for Goethe's theory of knowledge.

Delimitations
The scope of this study will be confined to Goethe's premises
concerning the human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and
1

2

growth in relationship to the learning process.

Implications for a

humanistic learning theory are subsequently examined.

Limitations
The assumption is made that the reader will be intimately
acquainted with Goethe’s novei in English translation.
English translations of Goethe's writing appear solely in this
dissertation unless it is deemed appropriate to include a word or
phrase in the original German to avoid ambiguity or misunderstanding.
Publication dates of the original German texts have therefore been
excluded from the citation of references.
German texts of Werther and

Authoritative editions of

the Autobiography were referenced, how

ever, in order to determine the accuracy and clarity of the English
translations used in this dissertation.
Work.3 by Goethe that are referenced in this study are limited
to those primary sources that are cited in the bibliography.

Approach to the Problem
The methodology of this study is as follows:

(a) a critical

examination of the character Werther based upon Goethe's concepts of
the human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and growth, (b) an
analysis of Goethe's epistemological premises from the context of the
novel,

(c) the derivation of six principles of learning theory from

the epistemological premises, and (d) the educational implications
and applications of the six principles of learning theory.

Rackground of the Problem
Goethe was an epistemologist.

Although he is most often por

trayed and reviewed as a latter eighteenth- and early nineteenth-

century German litterateur, he also possessed tremendous potential for
philosophical theorizing.

To elaborate on those concepts that pertain

to educational theory becomes a pivotal concern in any analysis of
Goethe’s intellective process.

In order to distill only the essential

ingredients from his thought, certain questions must be posed.
made Goethe an epistemologist?
epistemologist?

What

What constituted his perspective as an

What were the inherent principles of his epistemology?

By seeking a response to such questions as these, the potentiality of
Goethe as an epistemologist is realized.

Design and Organization of the Study
Goethe's method of learning and his subsequent determination of
the validity and legitimacy of knowledge is at the core of any examina
tion of his creativity*
.. {

It is precisely within the context of his writfj
■>

ings that Goethe revealed the functioning of his mind.

He built a

thought process based on a continuing and expanding dialogue between
himself and his literary creations.

Every facet of the relationship

which he constructed and the stance, which he determined was for his
own sake.

Goethe's entire methodology began with this relationship

to himself; he recognized his own needs and then proceeded to validate
them.

Because he demanded growth in his relationships, Goethe was

aware that every meaningful relationship was a potential learning
process.
Through recognition and understanding of his own self, Goethe
never permitted himself less than total command of any situation that
confronted him.

This ability allowed him to transfer any potentially

domineering or harmful forces onto a literary self-construct that could

then be manipulated and controlled.

In this manner, Goethe made certain

that the results of his actions were exactly what he willed them to be.
This was a means for inventing his own future and making sure of the pro
duct, which was himself.

What is actually being presented within his

poetry and prose is that which can be internalized by the self.

Goethe

identified the self as that embodiment of totality through which the
individual lives.

By selecting any of his major literary productions,

Goethe's readers are thereby provided with eu access to their own self.
Man is always in relationship to that which confronts him as a
determiner.

As long as he maintains a fully functional mind and recog

nizes the element of choice, then man is a self-determiner in relation
to that which is seeking to determine him.

Goethe used the self in

order to define and give meaning to the self.

He sought to determine

the nature of every meaningful relationship betx^een the self and that
which it confronted.

In his quest for meaning and control, Goethe

acknowledged that the self was the most salient confrontation of all.
Because the self wills a relationship to the self, the individ
ual establishes a relationship based on criteria validated as a self
determiner.

Goethe structured his epistemology from criteria that

were truth and he determined the nature of that truth.

It is the

nature of that truth which is going to free the self from all of the
inroads that rationalization insists upon making.

Whereas rationali

zation employs criteria based on untruth, Goethe demanded that the
self be confronted with truth and honesty.

Honesty is the principle

according to which the individual must evaluate, or validate, a value.
A self-determined mind is a mind that has willed to choose.

The

self always has choice and the freedom to exercise that choice as long

as it has control over its relationship with whatever the mind happens
to confront.

Self-determination refers to either the original cause or

to the effect of that over which the self has control.

This is the

realization by the self-determined mind that it always has confronting
it the implications of that choice upon which the self must act.

In

either circumstance, the relationship of the self to the question or
problem of choice and what constitutes freedom remains unchanged.
A value construct is built by the will so that the element of
choice can convey meaning and purpose.

The will determines what is of

greatest value for the self and this becomes the individual good.

Self-

determination, based on internal determination and will, is necessary to
validate what has become the good.

In order to actualize that which car

ries a supreme value for the individual, the motivation must be intrin
sic.

The resulting implication of the self's relationship to whatever

it wills becomes extremely significant.
Self-determination requires a will that is validated in order to
counter the process of rationalization.

This is the action that the

self has taken in its relationship to the will in order to determine
the will's legitimacy, meaning, and value.

In other words, it is through

validation that the self actualizes the potentiality of the will.

But

the self can validate rationalization too, because it rationalizes only
after it has validated.

Rationalization is untruth because the self

has not made use of or listened fully to the cognitive, or empirical,
factor.

Not only must the self validate the value, it must validate

the criteria used to determine the validity.

A fulJy functional mind

requires the self to use an empirical base that it controls.

Then the
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self can enter into a legitimate relationship with itself in order to
prevent dishonesty.

The self has a responsibility to Itself to do

that which is good, but the problem lies in determining the nature of
the true good.

Validating criteria and the responsibility to be honest

are the factors with which to solve this dilemma.

Goethe demanded that

the self go through the osmotic process of absorbing the validated good
and making it a part of the self.

This is the heart of the self's rela

tionship to that which it values.
Intentionality is that which has been declared and validated as
the good by the self.
self-determination?

What are the implications of this statement for
Learning is possible only if a relationship exists,

and a confrontation is necessary for any relationship.

Mutuality is

the process of dialogue that occurs in the relationship between two dis
tinct selves.

It is the interaction and cross-fertilization between

that which each self brings to the relationship.

Because of the spe

cificity of certain demands which Goethe placed on every relationship,
they each acquired a significant potentiality.

By making a determina

tion through the validation process, Goethe knew what his self needed.
In other words, Goethe intended that which he had validated as the
good.

Goethe recognized his own self as it was expressed in his

intentionality.
Perception influences both the validation process and inten
tionality.

The individual wills to see in a specific way because of

what he brings to that perception.

A responsibility inherent in the

type of relationship established must be accepted by the self.
will in turn carry over and determine the nature of perception.

This
As a
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result of this factor, a particular significance is assumed in the dis
cussion of value

Every confrontation implies a decision and inherent

within that decision is choice.

Choice is determined by what carries

a significant value and the subsequent implications of that value.
Such decisions arise from movement within the human mind that allows
the self to become transcendent.
implications are recognized.

New relational dimensions and their

What the self permits itself to see and

experience is determined by the honesty of the self.

Willing is free

only when a properly validated choice is based upon the selfinternalized criteria of honesty and truthfulness.
Inherent within all responsibility is choice.

To make a choice

means acting upon knowledge of the implications of that choice.

It is

the means by which the mind gathers a further sense of knowledge of the
object with which it is interacting.

In essence, the potentiality of

choice means the potentiality for freedom.

Choice becomes a means to

an end in which is seen the potential to transcend this end.
deal of responsibility is implied in such a process.

A great

To begin with,

the self has a responsibility to determine the meaning and validity of
responsibility.

The self must bring itself to the point of movement

in which it not only feels obligated but wills to act upon that sense
of obligation.
responsibility.
within the self.

In other words, the self must actualize and fulfill its
Goethe taught that responsibility is first realized
This means that the intellective process of the mine

must be continually feeding the self so that it can be responsible.

It

also implies that the character of a relationship determines the nature
of the responsibility.

In order to attain an awareness of self
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responsibility, the development; of depth within the totality of con
sciousness is necessary.

Only then will an obligation be realized end

its potentiality actualized.
Goethe was able to validate the specificity of certain things
for himself because of his understanding of the human will.
is unique to each self.

The will

It is represented by the cognitive, the affec

tive, and the conative domains of the intellect.

Only as a totality

does the self make a determination; that is, the individual serves
himself as the embodiment of his will and thereby establishes the
premise of totality.

From within the totality of the self the will

functions and receives its direction.

The source of the will is within

the self, and it is fed by the intellective process which gives it an
empirical base from which to act.

This empirical base, which is shared

by each of the three intellective domains, is essential because it is
always the internal which brings about that which a person wills.
Goethe was certainly aware of the cognitive elements inherent in the
affective domain.

What he required, therefore, was the legitimacy of

uhat feeling and emotion.
own mind.

Goethe demanded validation by means of his

This implied an empiricism, to be sure, but it was an empir

icism based on the relationship between the cognitive and affective
spheres of the intellect.
Goethe remained concerned with the ontological quest for the
totality of beingness.

Han realizes that he cannot define his respon

sibility to someone eJ.se until he has defined it within himself.

This

ontological quest is the process of the self experiencing what it has
validated for itself as the good.

It is recognition of the will and

Che element of determination in the sense of validation.

This process

of evaluation is an integral part of the totality of the self and a
vital component of that which makes the human mind fully operational.
The human mind must have something upon which to work.
the a priori (the given) exists, the mind cannot function.

Unless

Regardless

of the nature of this given, the mind must continually determine its
validity or nonvaliiity prior to internalizing the object of confron
tation.

Goethe suggested that the self begins with the given.

It is

the self which has to place some value on, as well as determine the
validity of, this given.

Meaning is derived from validation and to

understand meaning is to perceive an object in terms of its potential
ity.

The object does not become an end in itself because the individ

ual sees what it can do for his own self as well as for others.
Goethe experienced the growth and development of a conscious
ness that is found in the a priori.

Man is constantly building an

evolutionary consciousness which becomes a part of the human relation
ship.

That which Goethe did and did not allow to confront him (his

historicity) was directly controlled by his relationship to the
a priori.

In this way. Goethe could transcend the limitations that

man insists on imposing upon himself and that can destroy man’s true
insight.

He thereby remained in control and knew what he had and

what he needed.

This totality of experience brings into being the

full potential of the given.

It is evident that the will experiences

the a priori, but only when it has first experienced the good and knows
that it is the good.

Man continually builds the nature of the a priori

by means of the validation process.

As a result, the totality of the
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self recognizes that the intention of the a priori is to bring about
the fulfillment and completion of the validated good.
Above everything else, Goethe recognized that he was a human
being.

As he internalized, Goethe expressed and demanded a basic faith

in himself.

Faith is an expression of the ultimate act of freedom.

Choice is, therefore, affected by faith because it is dependent on the
nature of the individual's beingness as a self-determiner.

Man has a

responsibility in self-learning to start with faith and to recognize it
as such because he cannot be a self-determiner without it.

There is no

freedom if man does not have faith in himself s .d the concurrent deter
mination to validate this faith.
have an empirical base.

Goethe insisted that all men must establish a

relationship to their own selves.
ship?

This implies that faith does indeed

What is the nature of that relation

Is it purposive and honest, or does the self try to fool itself?

Faith implies both a sense of self-respect and trust in the self.
Goethe realized that knowledge is learned and possessed only in
terms of the certainty and fulfillment of totality.
self has to move on one of two premises.

Consequently, the

Either there is a proven abso

luteness (certainty) in what is known or else this certainty of knowl
edge is not possessed and it must be hypothesized.

Until the self is

certain, everything remains open-ended and it brings no closure.

In

the search for the true potentiality of the absolute, the question must
be posed as to whether the self determines absoluteness through valida
tion or whether this absoluteness is already determined for the self.
Knowledge is that which is a part of the self, which the self develops
and designs, which it internalizes, and which the self comes to

II

recognize in relationship to fact,
always moves from a given.

It must be remembered that the self

The potentiality of what comes to be the

given, the totality, implies

.at the whole is greater than the sum of

its parts.
Epistemological cc siderations of Goethe provide insight into
the factor of transparer

.

It is the ability to see through the object

of confrontation based on the empirical evidence obtained.

Transparency

allows the self to make use of externalities for what they are, with
their potentialities

as well as their limitations.

Goethe demonstrated

that it is only through dialogue that an individual can reveal himself;
that is, make himself transparent.

In order for learning to occur,

another self must be confronted if the individual is to fully know and
understand his own self.

This process of mutuality is established

between Goethe and his reading public through the medium of his volu
minous writings.

In his short novel, The Sufferings of Young Werther,

the vitality of the character Werther comes from Goethe himself.

It is

exactly what the author intentionally permits Werther to do or not to
do that is injected into this literary creation.

Knowledge, growth,

and learning are the end results of such reciprocal interaction between
Goethe and his audience.
Within the context of the novel Werther, Goethe presented a
learning construct and its methodology.

He placed the same demands

upon himself that he placed upon the internal development of the novel.
Goethe positioned this responsibility upon the self, since it makes the
ultimate determination and choice.

The subject matter of education,

which Goethe validated, is man and his relationship to himself.
mony to this principle is given by the novel.

Testi
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Goethe equated the creative act with the learning act.

To stop

the growth process would be suicide, because man dies when he no longer
grows.

Goethe realized that man, as a self-determiner, is constantly

involved In the process of designing his future.
are recognition of the need to never stop.
experiential process.

Learning and living

Education, therefore, is an

Man has the inherent epistemological responsibil

ity of determining and giving essence to the inner world of the self so
that the self wixls to live in order to experience.

Werther's failure

as a man, in contrast to Goethe’s affirmation of life, sustains the
validity and perpetuity of this premise.

Selection of the Novel
An analysis of the reasons for choosing this particular novel
of Goethe's will serve to reveal its epistemological significance and
its potentiality as a learning construct.

General comments and obser

vations will precede an examination of specific clues which Goethe
intentionally positioned in the opening pages of this work in regard
to the problem he confronted.
There are two levels from which to approach this novel.

It can

either be read and studied as a piece of literature or received as the
medium, or vehicle, for transmitting Goethe's epistemological premises.
If defined as a mode cf conveyance, the reader assumes the responsibil
ity of extracting from the novel whatever is present in the form of
epistemological input by Goethe.

It must always be remembered that

Goethe wove his philosophy into the context of his writings rather
than letting it stand in isolation.

His philosophy cai< be understood

only in terms of relationships, taking into consideration all of the
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subtle implications of the human mind.

The context, or nature, of rela

tionships along with the humanity within which these relationships are
allowed to grow become an integral part of Goethe's philosophy of living.
Within this short novel, there is substantial potentiality for
learning theory.

Goethe was offering his reading public a learning con

struct by means of the relationship he established with himself and his
literary creation.

The nature of the relationship was such that both he

and his -eaders would be provided with a learning methodology.

To deter

mine the premises of the learning construct from the medium of the novel
and then to apply these premises to the formulation of specific learning
principles becomes the means by which to isolate the educational applica
tion of Goethe's epistemology.
be posed for consideration:
theory from this novel?

Questions such as the following can then

What is it that is learned about learning

What are the implications for learning theory?

How is learning theory structured?
By alerting the reader to the true potential for defining Goethe
as an epistemologist, the novel serves as a means, or mode, by which to
illustrate how the mind of Goethe worked.

Delineating the functions of

Goethe's mind was a significant factor in choosing this particular work
for examination.
Goethe attracts his reader with even more strength by suggest
ing, through references to characters and events in hi

Aut ^biography,

a special relationship between The Sufferings of Young Werther and the
Autobiography.

In a brief and succinct statement, it can be said that

this relationship refers to the process of self-examination.

On its

surface, the novel appears to be structured around the self of Werther
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and his relationship with others.

Yet, if approached from a different

attitude and depth, Goethe can be seen depicting a possibility of action
which he may well have considered himself.

Consequently, it can be

posited that he wanted to learn what the end result of that action car
ried to its extreme would be.

Werther became a learning process, a sort

of experiment or test, to see whether or not this was what Goethe wanted
to do, where he wanted to go, what he wanted to be.
In every facet of the novel, the totality of Goethe's mind is to
be found.

What Goethe thereby implies is that man is the subject matter

of education.

The accent is on man and how he comes to know.

Goethe is really talking about is the fully educated man.
educate himself?

What must be made use of?

What

How must he

What must be willed in

order to guarantee this to himself?
For a more specific consideration of Goethe's intended purpose,
the first page or two of T ‘
e rCher (depending on the edition) will be
closely examined.

As Goethe (1969) claims in the thirteenth chapter

of his Autobiography, the novel itself "enlightens and instructs"
(Vol. 2, pp. 219-220).

Riggan (1973) correctly identifies Geist (mind,

spirit), Charakter (character), and Schicksal (fate) as being the "three
facets" (p. 266) which "form the focus of the story" (p. 262).

These

three words are incorporated into the editor's remarks preceding the
opening paragraph of the first letter dated Hay 4, 1777 (Goethe 1971,
p. 2).

In his analysis of Goethe, Ortega (1549/1968) develops a body

of thought which, if applied in this instance, may well clarify Goethe's
intention with regard to his choice and conspicuous placement of termi
nology .
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Ortega (1949/1968) offers the following observation:
Life neans the inexorable necessity of realizing the design
for an existence which each one of us is. This design in
which the I consists, is not an idea or plan ideated by the
person involved, and freely chosen. It is anterior to (in
the sense of independent form) all the ideas which his intel
lect forms, to all the decisions of his will. Our will is
free to realize or not to realize this vital design which we
ultimately are, but it cannot correct it, change it, abbre
viate it, or substitute anything for it (p. 141).
Continuing in an explanatory manner, Ortega insists:
A mar. possesses a wide margin of freedom with respect to his
I or destiny. He can refuse to realize it, he can be untrue
to himself. Then his life lacks authenticity. If "vocation"
is not taken to mean what it commonly does— merely a generic
form of professional occupation, of the civil curriculum— but
to mean an integral and individual program of existence, the
simplest thing would be to say that our I is our vocation.
Thus we can be true to our vocation to a greater or lesser
degree, and consequently have a life that is authentic to a
greater or lesser degree (p. 143).
In other words, it is the individual himself who designs the realization
or nonrealization of his vital design for an existence.

This conception

of a vital design is synonymous with destiny, vocation, and the I.

It

is an a priori that the self structures, validates, and experiences.
be authentic, it is a design the self must be true to.

To

Ortega then goes

on to reveal the very problem that Goethe confronted himself with and
wove into the fabric of Werther.

He states the following:

It is our life-design, which, in the case of suffering, does
not coincide with our actual life: the man is torn apart, is
cut in two— th man who had to be and the man he came to be.
Such a dislocation manifests itself in the form of grief,
anxiety, ennui, depression, emptiness; coincidence, on the
contrary, produces the prodigious phenomenon of happiness
(pp. 152-153).
It is now possible to suggest the correlation of Ortega's "life-design"
and "authentic I" with Goethe's Geist.

In similar fashion, the term

Charakter car. be considered as representing the actual life of the
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individual; that is, the manner in which he designs the realization of
his Geist.

It is a question of what the individual actually wills to

design, or realize.
"man’s life . . .

Ortega approaches this matter by suggesting that

is having to decide every moment what he must do the

next moment, and, therefore, having to discover the very plan, the very
design of his being" (p. 153).

This is the realization of the self-

determining characteristic of the will as manifested by an individual’s
character.

In Goethe's novel Werther, the author depicts the fate

(Schicksal) of Werther whose Geist and Charakter do not coincide.

Yet

Goethe transcends this surface incongruity by presenting a learning con
struct and methodology that analyzes the creative relationship between
Geist and Charakter.

The subsequent examination of Goethe’s novel will

explore the resulting implications of such an epistemology for learning
theory.
One further reason for having selected Werther as a novel worthy
of an analytical study must be mentioned.

Contained within the very

first paragraph of the first letter (May 4, 1771) are three pivotal
concepts which carry epistemological significance (Goethe 1971, p. 3).
Goethe considers the nature of the human heart, personal relationships,
and man within just a dozen sentences.
tive, or emotion and feeling.

The heart represents the affec

As one of t’

dor- ‘

\e Intellect,

its relationship to the human will is of great importance.

Personal

relationships are a prerequisite for the growth process, and probing
into the nature of man demands an individual responsibility to know
one's self.

It now becomes even more evident that: Goethe has utilized

the structure of a short novel to immediately confront both the reader
and himself with questions of profound epistemological implication.

Definition of Terms
A prlcri.

The a priori is the starting point, or given.

what the mine acts on in order to function.

It is

This means that the self is

placing a value on, and the will is determining the validity of, that
which is given.

Because the will is constantly structuring the nature

of the a priori, the self recognizes that the intention of the a priori
is to bring about the fulfillment and completion of the validated good.
Affective.

The affective is the intellective domain of emotion

and feeling.,
Awareness.

Awareness enables the self to develop, expand, and

generate a greater depth within the totality of consciousness.

It is

a growing realization of the specificity of the empirical aspects of
the knowledge possessed.
Choice.

Choice is inherent within decision.

It is a process

of selection in which means are selected to satisfy ends in which is
seen the potential to transcend the end.

Choice carries a significant

value which implies that the self must realize and evaluate the impli
cations of that value.
Cognitive.
Of

fh r

The cognitive is the empirical, or rational, domain.

1 "

Conative.

The conative is that domain of the intellect identi

fied by the interaction of the will with the cognitive and the affective
domains of the intellect.
Consciousness.

Consciousness exists the moment the function cf

the mind begins to operate.

It is a totality whose degree of depth is

determined by the inherent awareness, or knowledge factor, generated
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within the consciousness.

The specificity of these empirical thrusts in

consciousness is what permits the self to assign a value to perception.
Creativity.

Creativity is the development of new potentiality

between relationships.
self-determiner.

It is the process of designing the future as a

Creativity becomes growth as potentiality is actual

ized .
Dialogue.

Dialogue is communication between two distinct selves.

To dialogue, or to engage in dialogue, is to experience mutuality.
is to build and experience a creative relationship.

It

Dialogue reveals

the self through recognition of the transparency factor.
Empiricism.
knowledge.

Empiricism is the means by which the self acquires

The will must act from the cognitivity of ar. empirical base

in order for it to validate the specificity of the object of confronta
tion.

This implies that empiricism carries within itself the nature of

the relationship between the cognitive and affective domains of the mind.
Epistemology.
process.

Epistemology is concerned with the actual thought

It is the study of how the self comes to know and to determine

the validity and legitimacy of knowledge.

Mind and its function define

the scope of epistemology.
- ....

..un.

i.o evaluate -s to validate a value.

It is the

empirical thought process of determining the specificity of that
object which the mind confronts.
Experience.

Experience is the process by which the perceptive

ability of the conscious mind confronts and interacts with an object.
The nature of the subsequent relationship becomes a willful search for
meaning in order that the object of value may be made an integral part
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of the totality of mind.

Since the acquisition of knowledge results in

the modification, or transformation, of its antecedent state, the mind
becomes aware of the meaning of what the object can come to be (the sig
nificance of its potentiality).
Fact.

Fact is the certainty of knowledge.

ness which the self has validated.

It is an absolute

Facts are the means by which the

self moves toward a totality, because it is only in the fulfillment of
the certainty of totality that the self can know.

It is the nature of

the relationship between the fact and the whole which establishes its
value.
Faith.

The ultimate act of freedom is faith in the self.

Faith

validates the self's relationship to itself and thereby establishes an
empirical base.

It intrinsically motivates the self and permits the

mind to function with a willingness as a self-corrector.

It determines

the nature of freedom because it affects the choice made by the self.
Without faith in himself, man cannot assume the responsibility of selfdetermination.
Freedom.
ne

Freedom is the awareness of the decree * r consciou^-

permitted by the mind.

It is the transcendent act of freedom that

allows the mind to function so that it can determine meaning and purpose.
Freedom enables the mind to realize both limitations and values inherent
in whatever is confronted.
Good, the.

The good is that which carries a supreme value for

the self as determined by the will.
ing and purpose.

It is the self-realization of mean

Self-improvement becomes the good as it is realized in

the nature of relationships (between the self and the object of confronta
tion) that are learning constructs.
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Growth.

Growth is the process of the self experiencing the

inherent potentiality of a relationship.

Although the self is con

tinually transformed, it moves only as a totality.

This integration

of experience allows for a cycle of growth that transcends any notion
of finality.
Historicity.
the self.

Historicity is the autobiographical signature of

It is the nature of the self as determined by what it has

and has not allowed itself to confront.
Intellective Process.
of the thought process.

The intellective process is the totality

It is what permits the self to think by making

use of the wholeness of the relationship between the brain and the
process of the mind.

Unity and interdependence give rise to a total

ity of consciousness within this mental process.
Intentionality.

Intentionality is that which the self has

declared and validated as the good.

It is an intrinsic motivation

that makes a determination through the

;’ ....jn process so that the

if knows what it needs and proceeds to act from this base.
Knowledge.

Knowledge is the meaningfulness experienced by the

self in the type of relationship established to the object of learning.
The potentiality of knowledge is realized in its relationship to that
which is the given.
Learning Process.

Learning is the realization of new relation

ships and the subsequent actualization of their potentialities.

In order

to learn, the self must first experience a meaningful relationship with
whatever the subjeet/object of confrontation is.

The process of learning,

then, is the creative act of sell-examination by means of which the self
establishes the structure of growth.
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Meaning. Meaning is the significance determined by the self in
its relationship to an object.

As the self acts upon (experiences) the

object of confrontation, meaning is experiential!? internalized in terms
of the object's potentiality.

The object is not an end in itself because

the individual sees what it can do for himself and others.
Mind.

Mind is the self-generating process of intellective move

ment toward consciousness.

To function as a self-determiner, the mind

(intellective domains) must be balanced, be conscious of the obMe t that
it confronts, and continually determine the validitv r» nonvalidity of
that which it seeks to internalize.
self-corrective motivation o* '
Mutuali'

It is

a will which demands this

mxad.

Mutuality is the process of dialogue that occurs in

relationship between two distinct selves.

It is the interaction,

the cross-fertilization, and the reciprocating flew of communication
between that which each self brings to the relationship.

In order for

learning to take place and for the self to know itself, mutuality is
essential.
Ontology.
of beingness.

Ontology is the metaphysical quest for the totality

It is man looking at himself and defining his responsi

bility to what he finds within the self.
Perception.

Perception is that which brings understanding to

the self as determined by the will.

As such, perception consists of

the uniqueness and totality of each self with its consciousness.

This

means that the self must accept a responsibility for the nature of the
relationship established between itself and the object it confronts.
Relationship.

A relationship, whether internal or external,

implies confrontation and subsequent growth.

This means that the self
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recognizes and utilizes a learning object for what it is, both in terms
of its potentialities and limitations.

Learning is possible only if a

relationship exists.
Responsibility.

Responsibility means that the self must bring

itself to the point of movement so that it not only feels obligated but
wills to move or. that sense of obligation.
the potentiality of a relationship.

It is the actualization of

The self becomes responsible

(accountable) to itself through the process of self-determination as
it is being fed by the intellective process of the mind.

Responsibil

ity is the element of control in the process of choice.
Self.

The self is the totality of beingness.

It is the embodi

ment of unique experience that identifies the singularity of each
organism.
Se 1 f-Detertniner,

A self-determiner determines the nature of

every relationship between the self and that which it confronts.

Han

is a self-determiner to the extent that he establishes a valid rela
tionship to that which is seeking to determine him.

Self-determination

implies the existence of a fully functional mind and the recognition of
the element of choice.
Totality.
larity of purpose.

Totality is the holistic manifestation of the singu
The unity of purpose transcends the diversity and

particularity of its structural elements which allows for the realiza
tion of the full potentiality of that which a totality confronts.
Transcendence.
oi: honesty.

Transcendence of the self is achieved by means

It is the ability to rise above the limitations that the

self may choose to impose upon itself which can destroy insight, mean
ing, and potentiality.

To transcend is for the self to be in control,
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to determine meaning, and to know what it has and what it wants.

This

is a totality of experience that brings into being the full potential
of the a priori.
Transparency.

The factor of transparency is a realization of

what is true based on the empirical evidence.

It is the ability to

read and see through an object with the knowledge that the self brings
with it.

Transpaxency implies the responsibility of finding meaning in

relationships.

This means that it is only through dialogue that the

self can be revealed and made transparent.

The penetrative nature of

transparency leads directly to a transcendence which allox^s the self
to determine the meaningfulness of the object's potentiality.
Truth.

Truth is the validating and self-corrective process-

structure of knowledge.

The reality of truth is realized by the self

as it experiences and determines meaning.

In the learning process, it

is the cognitive, or empirical, domain of the intellect that guides the
search for truth.
Validation.

Validation is the process of determining the legit

imacy and reliability of knowledge.

The self acts to realize the correct

meaning of that with which it is interacting from the potentiality of
meaning inherent in the object.

By means of the nature of the relation

ship existing between the self and that which it values, criteria are
established for use in the validation process.
Value.

Value is the experience of meaning with its potential

for self-enhancement.

The will determines what is of value for the

self based on what the self has validated as a need.
Will.
self.

The human will originates within the totality of the

It functions as it is fed by the intellective process which
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provides the will with direction and an empirical base from which to act.
Self-determination is predicated on the evaluative and applicative dimen
sionality of the will.

The will structures the value construct through

validation and then determines the significance of meaning for the self
and for the seif's relationship to others.

The will is the embodiment

of the unique totality of self as it becomes conscious of purpose through
realizing the inherent meaning in that which is caused.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The Novel and Its Categories
of Analysis
Although there exists a multitude of articles, critiques, essays,
and reviews on the subject of Werther, it is possible to identify four
distinct approaches to the novel.
as follows:

These four categories are structured

(a) psychological and sociological interpretations, (b)

thematic representations,

(c) the identification of specific motifs

within the novel, and (d) rhp content and structure of the work as an
example of a particular literary genre.

A sample of the diversity of

material found within each of these major divisions will provide an
insight into the nature of the research which has and has not been
conducted with regard to Goethe’s short novel.

Psychological Interpretations
Psychological interpretations frequently include the notion of
Weltschmerz.

Rose. (1924) states that Weltschmerz is "the feeling of

dissatisfaction, from the unsolved conflict between the ideal and the
actual" (p. 4).
state which

He continues by defining this concept as "the psychic

ensues

when there is a sharp contrast between a man's

ideals and his material environment, and his temperament is such as
to eliminate the possibility of any sort of reconciliation between the
two" (p. 5).

Rose believes that "Werther is the analysis of a soul
25
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that cosies to grief through inability to attain harmony with the outer
world” (p. 19).

The novel is defined in the following terms:

[It is] a svxabol of the struggle of the human spirit against
its material restrictions.
Its essential significance is
that it pictures the disintegration of a cultured and sensi
tive mind which is unable to adjust Itself to the outer world
when compelled to cope with concrete problems. Goethe has
given us a psychological novel (Rose 1931, p. 155).
Reiss (1959) suggests that "Werther*s life is determined by the polarity
between man's limitation [Einschrankung] and his urge for freedom"
(p, 88).

Consequently, a condition develops in which "Werther opposes

to the demands and happenings of the external world the conditions of
his own inner being" (p. 85).

Werther becomes "a man who is finally

broken by the tensions between the demands of external life and the
desires of his inner life" (p. 91).

Kuhn (1976) proposes that Werther

represents "a universal human trait, a dissatisfaction with reality
that produces a certain longing after something beyond the mortal con
dition, a restless striving that, at least in life, is condemned to
remain unsatisfied.
ennui" (p. 168).

The background of unfulfilled aspirations is

Thorlby (1976) intends to discuss Goethe's creative

process, or genius, and points to Werther as a means to illustrate "the
distinction between reality and imagination" (p. 150), "the relationship
of the outer to the inner world" (p. 151), "the relationship of imagina
tion— and in particular the literary imagination— to life" (p. 151).
According to his analysis, "the blurring of the distinction between
literature and life is what Werther is all about" (p. 155).

In an

essay by Stelnhauer (1974), Werther is acclaimed as "a magnificent psy
chological study of a modern type:
(p. 9).

the neurotic artist-intellectual"

Steinhauer (1970) interprets Werther as "the destruction of

27

an extreme idealist by his contact with inexorable reality" (p. 118).
It is described in the following language:
Werther is not primarily a novel about a tragic love, but a
profound character study of a psychological type who has
become more and more central in our Western culture:
the
disillusioned or frustrated man, who cannot find a place
for himself in society; for whom all life turns sour and
the world becomes a prison; in whom these sentiments or
attitudes assume pathological intensity (p. 108).
Atkins (1948a) perceives Werther's suffering in terms of a sort of idle
ness or inactivity (TrSgheit).

Werther's tragedy is that he has "a

highly developed inner life not balanced by any corresponding degree of
external activity" (p. 549).

Atkins maintains that "the disproportion

between speculation and activity . . .

is fatal for Werther" (p. 549).

He also believes that the novel should be analyzed as a process of
behavior and comments that "the interest of the novel is not in why
Werther behaves as he does, but in how he will behave under given con
ditions" (p. 568).

In a later analysis, Atkins (1949) labels the novel

as an "objective study of self-destructive speculation" (p. 1).

Clark

(1947) writes that Werther is physically normal but that his "trouble
is strictly psychic.

He thirsts to know the innate constitution of

things, the whole; but that constitution . . .

is unknowable" (p. 275).

Werther manifests an unwillingness to recognize that "the individual is
foredoomed to perceive always only a part of the whole, since the whole
itself is absolutely unknowable" (p. 275).

MolnAr(1969), in a related

line of thought, states that man is able to know the world within cer
tain limits but that "the price of knowledge is isolation from the pure
object, from the objective totality for which he never ceeses to yearn"
(p. 232).

Werther is an individual who "translates this yearning into
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a search within his own limited realm which he may conduct . . . with
resigned despair tempered only by the thought that the farce may be dis
continued at will as soon as its futility becomes unendurable" (p. 232).
Bragg (1976) assumes that "Werther is an exposition of Goethe's basic
theories of psychology" (p. 132).

The novel, he concludes, "is a delin

eation of the functions of the human brain and the social ramifications
of unequal endowment with these powers" (p. 137).

Morgan (1957), in

the introduction to his translation of Werther, declares it to be "the
first psychological novel in German" (p. vii), and Weigand (1962) is of
the opinion that "the story has a powerful appeal for the psychologically
oriented reader who follows the stages of the hero's mental disintegra
tion with rapt fascination" (p. viii).

Brinkmann (1976) stresses the

concepts of individuality and subjectivity, and Graham (1973) emphasizes
that "Goethe's novel is concerned, with inwardness, with its tragic uncreativity as well as with the undying glory of its impulse" (p. 118).
Riggan (1973) thinks he has found in Werther "the artist, the man of
powerful sensibility and sensitivity and of sudden passion, the man of
the present" (p. 253).

He reports on the following effect of the novel:

[Werther] firmly established in world literature a new herotype: the young man of extreme emotionalism, of subject
ivism bordering on the narcissistic, of sensibility . . .
of an inner dichotomy prefiguring that which was later to
erupt in Faust, and of profound loneliness and Weltschmerz
(p. 252).
Fricke (1950, pp. 33-39) emphasizes the intensity of Werther's emotion
ally created world and the meaning of the eighteenth-century Storm and
Stress (Sturm und Drang) conception of genius for young Goethe.

Good-

heart (1968) identifies the subservience of Werther to his heart and
makes the following remark:

29

This is the blasphemy of the cult of feeling:
the implicit
belief that personal suffering has no boundaries. God,
society, mortality: all give way to an all-encompassing
suffering. Werther's suicide is a supreme manifestation
of this exaltation of suffering (p. 73).
Goodheart then adds that "the self (the I) is the ultimate referent of
all of Werther’s feelings and actions" (p. 66).

He suggests, in refer

ence to Werther, that "the real theme of the book is his uncertain selfesteem” (p. 67).

Introductory remarks to Stahl's (1942/1964) translation

of Werther suppose that "the problem of the self is presented as a tragic
conflict between the equally justifiable, but irreconcilable values of
self-expression and self-control" (p. ix).

Werther is depicted by Goethe

as "a man diseased by his own introspectiveness, rendered impotent by
extreme self-esteem" (p, xix).

He is a character who disintegrates

"through a lack of balance in the exercise of both rational and emotive
powers" (p. xx).

Korff (1954, p. 297) is attracted to the idea that the

power of the self can create its own conception of the world.

In other

words, the world for Werther is represented by his own way of looking
at, or perceiving, things.

Blackall (1976) contends that "the work is

to be concerned with man's attempt to construct an artificial world as
a surrogate for reality" (p. 21).

What Werther creates is "an artifi

cial order based not on any relationship of the Individual to what lies
outside himself, but on a total absorption in his own thoughts" (p. 23).
Blackall concludes that "his dilemma is his inability to accept any
reality outside of and independent of himself" (p. 27). Lange (1949/1962)
discusses the novel in terms of "the condition of a supremely sensitive,
but supremely unstable human being" (p. vi).

He perceives Werther to be

"a young man who is crushed and destroyed by the unbearable weight of
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his own passions'* (p. vi).

Dieckmann (1974), in a complimentary observa

tion, assumes that "it is the total abandonment to his emotion which
makes Werther so disturbing to the reader.

No struggle, no attempt to

control his love, no sense of responsibility— all these terms are phan
toms in the presence of his sweeping emotion" (p. 117).

Dieckmann speaks

of "the shockingly self-centered quality of his emotions" (p. 119) and
declares that "Werther*s egocentricitv . . . knows no bounds" (p. 119).
Reiss (1971) concurs with this stress on the emotions and writes that
"the centre of the work is Werther*s inner experience, and his experi
ence is determined by his emotions" (p. 24).
dominates Werther*s thought and activity.
ing to master his feelings" (p. 26).

He explains that '’emotion

He is neither able nor will

Reiss believes that Goethe has

presented "an analysis of a neurotic personality” (p. 45).

His conclu

sion is that "Werther is the work in which Goethe sought to come to
terms with the role and function of feeling in life" (p. 52).

Maurer

(1958-1959) maintains the psychological thread by interpreting the con
flict within Werther as "the clash of passion ending tragically in face
of the realities of life" (p. 378).
on the element of consciousness.

Trilling and Engelberg both focus

Trilling (1972) speaks in Hegelian

terms of "the conception of the disintegrated, alienated, and distraught
consciousness" (p. 47).

Of the two main divisions in Werther, "the first

is an account of the hero's effort to ward off the encroachment of dis
integration, to remain an honest soul; the second tells of his free
choice of disintegration" (p. 48).

Engelberg (1972) addresses the ques

tion of Werther*s sufferings and is convinced that they "are precisely
those of a man whose conscience cannot confront his consciousness when
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it reveals to him the process of accelerating the failure of achieving
all goals" (p. 67).

Wilkinson and Willoughby (1962), however, maintain

that "Werther exhibits the psychical structure of the. SchwSrmer" (p. 46).
They explain the novel as follows:
[It exhibits] the calamitous effects of what the eighteenth
century called Schwarmerei, or Enthusiasm; by which it under
stood, not intensity of feeling, but a tendency to exalt that
which is within . . . at the expense of that which is without,
to press impatiently for immediate realization of what the
mind can envisage while ignoring the claims of the factual
situation (p. 43).
Feise (1914) is convinced that "Werther is personified youth" (p. 289)
and that for him to be even considered as a married man x</ould be con
tradictory (1926, p. 222).

Fairley (1947) has determined that Werther

is merely an extension of young Goethe’s state of mind.

It is an

adolescent mind that "is a state of confusion, of darkness, of emotion
running riot, of complete and acknowledged unintellectuality" (p. 47),
Fairley states the following with regard to the immature Werther:
He affects us rather as one who is at the beginning of
life and who fails as yet to perceive any order in it
whatsoever. He finds himself surrounded by chaos or by
illimitable forces that he cannot comprehend and it is
these forces that overpower him at the last (p. 47).

Sociological Interpretations
Lukdcs (1968) is a contemporary European author who espouses a
sociological Interpretation of Werther.

Lukdcs emphatically claims

that "Werther is the culmination of young Goethe's struggles for the
free and universally developed man" (p. 44).

He explains that "Werther's

conflict, Werther's tragedy is the tragedy of bourgeois humanism and
shows the insoluble conflict between the free and full development of
personality and bourgeois society itself" (p. 45).

Leppmann (1961)
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says that Goethe's novel "combines the appeal of a superbly written love
story with the analysis of a quite specific sociological case history:
that of a man for whom the fashionable prejudices of the time loom as
tragic obstacles which cannot be overcome" (p. 17).

Hatfield (1963)

writes that Goethe's intention "to portray a suicide with such empathy
and power, to contrast the delicate, charismatic young man to the
unfeeling world of bourgeois respectability and aristocratic pride,
was a defiant challenge to the age" (p. 38).
the middle-class limitations of Lotte.

Silz Q972) focuses on

He suggests the following:

The middle-class mind, so sure of its decisions within
accepted norms, soon becomes helpless when confronted
with the extraordinary. One of its dubious resources is
silence, a stubborn or timid failure to communicate.
This is a factor in typical bourgeois tragedies, and is
illustrat i by Lotte's later course (p. 130).
Fiedler (1951/1955) finds Werther to be "the first anti-bourgeois novel"
l"
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(p. 183) and "an attack on the role of woman in the middle-class world"
(p. 183).

Fiedler believes that "the essential subject of the Werther

novel is always innocence and decadence— what is innocence and how can
it be preserved in a corrupt world?" (p. 186).

Ames (1977) identifies

the. bourgeois notion of competitiveness as a key element in the novel.
Werther "competes to surpass Albert, the ultimate bourgeois, in both
emotional capacity and practical success" (p. 138).

Apparently, the

sorrows of Werther "result from his inability to achieve in this life
unity of emotional and practical superiority which would prove to him
self and to others that he is truly an extraordinary man" (p. 138).
Hazard (1954) presents the following judgment in reference to
eighteenth-century European thought:
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When he created Werther, the youthful Goethe had a new
human type in mind.
In Werther’s case love would be but
one more addition to the intolerable burden of one whom
society ir -itated and life embittered, one whose dearest
wish was to mingle, beyond the grave, with the spirit of
the Universe (p. 281).
Atkins (1949, p. 70) points to the Storm and Stress ideology of anti
social individualism apparent in the novel, and Stahl (1942/1964), in
fundamental agreement, adds that "Werther's search is a quest for a
society which could not be found in his day— a society in which the
individual could be preserved in his rights, yet also merge with
others" (p. xv).

Korff (1954, p. 303) reports of Werther's negative

relationship to bourgeois society, and Lange (1949/1962) represents
Werther as a youth who "found himself sadly, even tragically, in con
flict with an insensible

society, [so] that he could not maintain

himself in a world which persisted in Its conventional and emotional
habits" (p. vi).

Goethe had described, according to Lange, the "nearly

irreconcilable tension between the creative and irrational powers of
the individual and the compulsion of the objective world" (p. xii) .
In a later essay, Lange (1953) speaks of the "conflict between sensi
bility and the social order" (p. 44).

He concentrates on this assess

ment of the period in which the novel took form and writes the following:
[Goethe] offers . . . an extraordinarily detailed picture of
that spiritual dilemma in which the sentimental mind found
itself— to live in an obsolescent and confined society in
which yet here and there new and revolutionary energies of
feeling and speculation emerged— energies, however, which
with all their intensity remained inarticulate because
suitable and generally intelligible terms for them had
not yet evolved (p. 34).
MUller (1969, pp. 6-8) believes that Werther symbolizes the transition
from a feudal to a bourgeois society and that through him are legitimized
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the morality and mores of this new world.

Muller also claims that

Werther is the first novel of eighteenth-century German literature to
have depicted and acknowledged the modern world of conflict within the
context of society as a whole.

To conclude this discussion of psycho

logical and sociological interpretations, Steinhauer (1974) admits of
the relationship between these two seemingly diverse approaches to the
novel by writing that "Werther is a masterly psychological study of a
young man rebelling against society" (p. 6).

He is led to assert that

"Werther is the first novel that deals mainly with this conflict between
nature and culture" (p. 7).

Themes
Salm (1973) introduces the theme of existentialism into his
analysis of Goethe's novel.

He contends the following:

When the structure of Werther is seen in the light of those
aspects of the novel which tend to place it in the company
of existentialist literature, it becomes possible to see a
connection between its tragic form and the sense of a futile
thrashing about in an absurd world (pp. 54-55).
Salm emphasizes "Werther1s alienation from the surrounding life of nature
and society and his nightmarish sense of the irrationality that pervades
all existence" (p. 51).

Dye (1975) alerts the reader to "the accusatory

tendency in Werther, the sense of conflict which permeates the book
between man and his world and thus mar. and his Creator, the implicit
existential cry" (p. 316).

The novel depicts the world in the follow

ing manner:
It is the idea conveyed that the vorld is an intrinsically
inhospitable environment for such a creature as man and that
God is either non-existent or a mysterious stranger. The
book’s equation of the unattainable with the most desirable
amounted to an assertion of the disharmony in the universe
(p. 313).
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Dye desired to illuminate what he calls "the work’s main challenge:

its

implicit claim that there is no correlation in the cosmos to man's yearn
ings" (p. 327).

Parry (1963) is of the opinion that "Werther's cry of

despair reverberates through literature.

When the structure of life

becomes disjointed and seems to spin out of control the fragments are
terrifying" (p. 92).

There is a "sense of terrible abandonment" (p. 96)

about Wertber as he reveals "the tone of a man whose predicament is
existential" (p. 96).

Fricke (1950, p. 60), in his essay on Goethe's

Werther, offers the generalization that what happens in ail eminent
poetic creations is the transformation of the world as it is into
grandiose images of what it could ».nd should be.

Boerner (1968b,

p. 264) senses this tragic conflict of the individual with the inevitable course of events in life.

He attributes Werther's downfall to the

disproportion between the world and the man of sentimentality and inspir
ation.

Werther is broken by the excess of his feelings and his inherent

nature.

Atkins (1949), in expressing his views on the theme of Werther

and the world, states the following:
A frustrated generation sensed in the novel the poetic
representation of its own spiritual crisis, for Werther's
suicide was the outstanding expression, in the form of an
action, of the doubts which many had about the value of
life in what was no longer felt to be the best of all
possible worlds (p. 65).
Another indictment of the world in which man finds himself is given by
Butler (1958) who feels that Werther represents "an individual isolated
from society by the misery of its suffering and finding no redress in
the universe which appears totally indifferent" (p. 258).

Korff (1954,

p. 296) is convinced that Goethe has presented the unrequited love of
a sentimental man for a world which everywhere refuses to grant the
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infinite demands of his inner self.

To reinforce this notion, Korff

(p. 307) asserts that the suffering of Werther ultimately brings before
God a mute accusation against the world.

Feise (1914) writes that

Goethe depicts a "Werther who, living in his own world of ideals, is
shipwrecked in the encounter with hostile reality" (p. 257).
(1976) contends that "the novel . . .

Blackall

is concerned with the ’sufferings'

of a man attempting to find some order of existence into which he can
integrate himself without losing himself" (p. 39).

The heart of

Blackall's position is that "ultimately the book is about the quest
for order— order not in the sense of social or domestic order, but as
the basic ontological necessity" (p. 40).

Lange (1953) decides that

the "demonstration of the tragic condition of life is, in varying set
tings, the central motif of all of Goethe's fiction" (p. 54).

Conse

quently, Werther becomes "the portrait of an eccentric in a world that
has itself lost its centre" (p. 37).

Goethe strove to convey Werther's

"discovery of an inevitable sense of loneliness, the recognition of the
void which he must bring himself to accent" (p. 37).

Lange speaks of

the "Wertherian experience of a dissolving universe, held together
only by the intensity of a restless mind, clinging, not to dubious
reality, but to remembered, filtered, and reassociated fragments of
feeling, observation, and learning" (pp. 38-39).

There is in the novel

"that predominant element of abysmal loneliness from which only tor
rential speech offers relief" (p. 39).

Lange concludes that Goethe

has written an "account of a crumbling world" (p. 40).

It is the

tragic state of "a world of ever decreasing vitality" (p. 43).

Spann

(1972) views the period in which Werther was conceived as "a time of
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crumbling values" (p. 77).

He defines the sufferings of Werther as the

"sorrows of the Vest" (p. 74) and is persuaded that the concern of the
novel is with specific ethical values which remain appropriate even for
the modern world of today.

Hatch (1974) stresses the theme of human

relationships in Goethe’s novel.

She declares that "Werther's devotion

to his friend Wilhelm and his love for Lotte are aspects of his aware
ness of himself in relation to others, of his sympathetic participation
in the experience and being of another person" (p. 110).

Hatch is con

vinced that for Werther "it is the conviction that what matters is being
a human being and enjoying intimacy with other human beings" (p. 109).
Dieckmann (1962a) investigates Goethe’s attitude toward different types
of freedom and applies a portion of her findings to Werther.

She states

that "Werther belongs to the category of unfree characters" (p. 29) and
makes the following generalization:

"One might almost divide Goethe's

characters into those who act according to their own free choice and
those who do not.

All the demonic characters, the driven ones, belong

in the latter category:

Werther, Eduard, Orest, Tasso, Faust" (p. 29).

Brickman (1949), interested in the educational application of the novel.,
proposes that "Goethe’s basic educational ideals are individualism in
Die Leiden des jungen Werthers" (p. 147).

In an assessment

of Werther

by Stahl (1942/1964), it is suggested that "God is the ultimate centre
of his thought" (p. xvi).

Stahl expands upon this notion by explaining

that "it is the relation between Werther and his God rather than between
him and his fellow men that gives us the clearest indication of his
malady" (p. xvi).

Staiger (1952/1960, pp. 166-173) speaks of Werther

in terms of the totality of man and of the oneness, or unity, of body
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and soul.

He considers Werther's passionate speech, as well as his love,

to be inspired by the experience that man is an inseparable whole,
Blackall (1976) thinks that the book depicts the following:
It deals with man's struggle for self-fulfillment with refer
ence to what lies outside the self, for realization of self
without total retreat into the self. Werther falls: he
does retreat into the self and the self disintegrates because
nothing outside it really had independent validity for him
(pp. 39-40).
Stahl (1949) clarifies what he considers to be the main cause of
Werther's misanthropy.

He writes that Werther "perishes because he

is tormented by the instability of life.

Instead of participating in

its constant ebb and flow, he is detached from the life-giving force,
and remains a mere spectator of the great cycle of change (p, 49).
In introducing his translation of Werther, Lange (1949/1962) decides
that "in the experience of human insufficiency lies, ultimately, the
key to Werther" (p. viii).

He also comments upon young Goethe's

"assertions of the creative freedom of the individual" (p. vii) and
the relevance of this notion for the novel.

Reiss (197.1) concurs

with the emphasis on the theme of freedom and focuses upon elements
within the book that imply "the pol rity which determines Werther's
inner life, the conflict between the limitations imposed upon man and
his urge for freedom" (p. 37).

Beutler (.1969, p. 148) bridges the

categories of theme and motif with his reference tc Goethe's repeti
tious use of the word heart.

This term emerges again and again in

the letters of Werther and is the theme, according to Beutler, that
dominates the entire novel.
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Motifs
Of the variety of motifs identified and examined within the
novel, suicide is undoubtedly the most recurrent.

Diez (1936) empha

tically concludes that "Werther's suicide is the principal theme, the
most important event and climax of the whole development" (p. 830).
Wilson (1975) supposes that "Werther seeks death as the only avenue
to freedom and fulfillment of his nature" (p. 105).

Wilson asserts

that "the freedom which Werther seeks is a release frora the prison of
his own self-destructive soul, which . . .

is overheated and run wild;

suicide is thus an affirmation of the conditions of immortality"
(p. 106).

Feuerlicht (1978) can find no reason for Werther's suicide

other than his suicidal drive.

Werther’s death instinct equates to

"an irrational death wish" (p. 479).

The relation between suicide, and

the Oedipus complex is described by Faber (1973).

He reports that "the

separation that stands behind Werther*s tragic behavior, including his
suicidal death, is the separation from the mother" (p. 244).

Faber is

certain that "in the character of Werther we behold a human being whose
regressive inability to separate from the maternal figure provokes his
regressive attachment to Charlotte and ultimately his suicidal death"
(pp. 275-276).

Salm (1973) perceives Werther's suicide as an act of

metaphysical rebellion.

He maintains that "it is possible to see

Werther's act not only as a defeat but also as a rebellion against
his Einschrankung, his incarceration behind thick walls of illusion
which he is vainly struggling to break down" (p. 51).

Ittner (1942)

discusses Werther's suicide in terms of the feeling of sinfulness for
having caused Lotte to endure such great unhappiness.

Ittner declares
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that "consciousness of guilt and a desire to atone for such guilt form
a motif in the novel and this must be considered as the immediate . , .
cause of Werther’s death" (p. 421).

As Werther contemplates and actu

ally accomplishes his own death, Ittner contends that Goethe has created
a character "who finally takes cognizance of the institutions and the
standards of the world,, and who acknowledge.'; them by sacrificing him
self" (p. 426).

In their observations of Werther, Dukas and Lawson

(1969) remark that "having failed to form understanding relationships
with the people in day-to-day life . . . the superfluous man, seeks,
like Werther, to create a situation from which there is only one
escape:

death" (p. 151).

Victor (1949) mentions, in reference to

the novel, that "suicide is here presented as the necessary conse
quence of a passion whose power transcended the ’bounds of humanity’"
(pp. 33-34).

Borgese (1950) contends that "Werther is the myth of

suicide, death in surrender" (p. 3).

Korff (1954, p. 296) emphasizes

Werther's self-destruction too, and believes this element of suicide
to be the innermost idea of the work.

Korff points out that Goethe

described those "Faustian" men of that time who were bound together
in their uncertainty over life by a deep and grave disposition toward
suicide.

Fetzer (1971) analyzes what he calls "the principal gesture

in Goethe's novel:

the. embrace" (p. 87).

The three types of embraces

as determined by Fetzer (tne cosmic, the concrete, and the empty) all
represent stages through which Werther progresses.

Schumann (1956)

extracts the notion of polarity from the book and discusses in his
article "the entire polarity of Werther:

Werther the genius of feel

ing . . . Werther the victim of emotional self-pampering" (p. 535).
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Neumann (1973) is curious as to Werther's ability as a lawyer and wishes
"to see then if his legal activity, or lack of it at times, in any way
contributed to his end" (p. 219).

He expresses the opinion that Werther

is "a young lawyer whose self-doubts devour him" (p. 222).

Diez (1936)

is intrigued by Goethe's use of metaphorical language in Werther. He
speaks of "the theme which is to dominate both the story and the imag
ery of its language:

the analogy and relationship of physical and men

tal suffering" (p. 832).

Diez further recognizes that "the metaphors

taken from death, sickness, and pain saturate and flavor the language
of Werther throughout, and when lifted out of the text, form a great
cycle of closely related and interwoven imagery" (p. 989).

Goethe had

apparently realized "the relation of the world of emotions and the mind
to the human body and its organs . . . and the importance of the rela
tion for linguistic expression" (p. 1005).

From her detailed study of

Goethe and Werther, Graham (1977) offers the following insight:
Only in its form had the metamorphosis its author had under
gone in the process of composing found its proper precipitate.
Only there— not in its Stoff— was he to be found. Not to
understand the form of his book was not to understand the
book; worse still, it was not to understand the san the
author had become in the writing of it (pp. 31-32).
Tobol and Washington (1977) concentrate on Goethe's motif of Homer as
read by Werther.

They write that "Homer has served his narrative pur

pose, underscoring with the connotative power of literary allusion the
changes in Werther*s perception of reality and foreshadowing his demise"
(p. 601).

Tobol and Washington affirm that "Werther’s selective reading

of Homer . . . drew his sensitive spirit into delusions from which there
was no return" (p. 601).

Butler (1958) isolates the element of time and

reports that "in Werther . . . time marks and accelerates the progress
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of an incurable disease and is one of the actively destructive agents"
(p. 248).

According to Butler * there is "a double time in the novel.

In fact one is almost forced to discriminate between 'real time' and
the 'emotional time'" (pp. 248-249).

McCormick (1976) argues that the

landscape descriptions in Werther are psychologically intended to
express aspects of human behavior.

He concludes that "to see without

being seen . . . and thereby both to enjoy landscape aesthetically and
to render it familiar, destroying what is unknown in it, is to appro
priate the world.
does" (p. 206).

This is, in a broad symbolic sense, what Werther
Forster, Dvoretzky, and Graham each focus upon the

significance of Lessing's drama, Emilia Galotti, to Werther.

Forster

(1958) assumes that the message of Emilia Galotti "is the message of
the whole play, not of any particular scene" (p. 45).

He acknowledges

the placement of the drama in Goethe's novel with the following assess
ment :
Werther himself saw the parallels between his own situation
and that in Lessing's play. He was in that frame of mind
in which one applies everything one reads to one's own case.
He cannot well have failed to see the affinity of the
Prince's character to his own. . . . And so Werther, con
scious of his temptation to murder, sees it reflected in
Lessing's play (pp. 43-44).
Dvoretzky (1962) claims that "Werther is, after all, a psychological
novel" (p. 25).

He then draws the implication that "Emilia Galotti

is a symbol in Goethe's eyes for death or its imminent approach"
(pp. 25-26).

Graham (1962) develops the connection of Lessing's

drama to Goethe's novel by discussing the relationship between
Goethe and his Werther.

She writes the following:

If it [Werther] tells us anything about its author, it is
that here is indeed a master of his medium; one who has
decisively severed his fate from that of his hero in that
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he has conquered both the external medium of his craft and
the internal medium of his creative depths. It tells us
so by its inner form, and by what we now recognize to be
a profoundly ambiguous and ironical poetic symbol: the
symbol of Emilia Galotti (p. 24),

Literary Genre
Goethe’s short novel has also been portrayed as representing a
specific literary genre.

This fourth category in the review of Werther-

ian literature will be a brief summary concerning two of the more wellknown classifications:

(a> a story of love, and (b) an example of the

eighteenth-century literature of sentiment.

Atkins (1949) addresses

the former designation by expressing his view that "so long as feeling
and suffering are in some sense one, it may be said that Werther has
properly been called a book of eternal love" (p. 218).

Bullock (1932)

included this work in his review of three thwarted romances.

Bullock

asserts the follox^ing about Werther:
[It] described, x*ith a minimum of concrete incident and with
a maximum of passionate description and sentimentally specu
lative digression, philosophical and social, a supersensi
tive young man's enamorment with an exquisitely virtuous
young woman, and the effect wrought upon his battered soul
by her marriage to another (p. 431).
Victor (1949) is a spokesman for placing the novel in the latter cate
gory of literary genres.

He announces that "it is the state of his

generation's soul which Goethe sets forth in Werther" (p. 28).

Vietor

expands upon this statement by observing in the book "the softening and
the excess of emotion which we call sentimentality.

A tense and ideal

istic youth found itself cut off from the world of great action, worthy
achievement, and lofty striving by an antiquated social order" (p. 29).
The result for these young men was that "the fulfillment which they

could not find in active life they were forced to seek in inward exis
tence" (p. 33).

Atkins (1949) echoes this opinion when he affirms that

Goethe’s novel was "an example of the international literature of senti
ment which flourished in the latter half of the eighteenth century"
(p. 4).

He regards Werther as "a sentimental novel in which could be

recognized familiar elements of melancholy, pathos, despair, social
revolt, and idealized nature" (p. 65).

Korff (1954, p, 297) is con

vinced that Werther embodies the inspired, sentimental man more clearly
than any other figure of Storm and Stress fiction.

Weigand (1962)

assumes that contemporary readers perceive the novel "as a highly
illuminating, vivid, and colorful document reflecting the Zeitgeist
of the ’age of sentiment’" (p. vii).

Gray (1967) is convinced that

"Werther's feelings are those of an extreme sentimentalist" (p. 49).
He proposes that Goethe "had drawn a picture of a youth from his day,
overjoyed at the emotions aroused in him by the scenes of Nature, wide
open to every impression, living from moment to moment at an intensity
almost unbearable" (p. 49).

In a variation on the application of senti

mentality to Werther, Dleckmann (1974) explains as follows:
We are not dealing with a "sentimental" work, but rather
with a beautifully constructed novel which deliberately
presents the tragedy of a sentimental hero in a nonsentitnental mode. It is not the author, but his character,
Werther, who is sentimental (p. 113).
Trunz (1951/1963, pp. 551-553) is somewhat more general and universal
in his comments about the position of the novel in the literary world.
He observes that it was by writing Werther that the first modern German
novel was brought into being.

For Germany, Trunz declares, Goethe's

book was the beginning of modern prose.
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As is evident from this survey of the literature, there has been
neither an intensive nor extensive study of the novel Werther from the
stance of Goethe's epistemology.

The novel has been approached almost

exclusively by way of its literary merit, leaving its potentiality as
a learning construct to go virtually unrealized.

Research and writing

which does relate to the epistemological aspects of both Goethe and
the novel will be incorporated into chapter IV of the dissertation.
Literature concerning the educational significance of specific learn
ing principles derived from the premises of Goethe's epistemology will
be surveyed in chapter V of the dissertation.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY

Goethe’s concepts of the human will, the self, responsibility,
choice, and growth will be identified and subsequently utilized as the
skeletal frame from which to construct the working principles of his
thought process.

By focusing on Goethe's actual thinking and how he

comes to know, the novel and its interpretation become a means, or
mode, with which to illustrate the epistemological functioning of his
mind.

In looking at the intellective totality of the man, Goethe's

potentiality as a learning theorist is recognized.
Goethe's epistemology manifests itself through an analytical
study of the character Werther.

In order to define Goethe’s theory of

knowledge, however, it is necessary to determine its application.

This

means that the constituent elements of Goethe's epistemology both flow
into and out of the novel.

It is a cycle that provides for a unified

and consistent philosophy of knowledge.

The identification of Goethe

as an epistemologist is accordingly brought to the novel and provides
the basis for its interpretation.
Within the novel Werther, Goethe presents a learning construct.
This construct will be defined by means of its premises as determined
from within the context of the novel.
derived from these premises.

Learning principles can then be

By thinking through the premises of the

construct and setting up a parallelism between the premises and the
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evolving principles, attention will
inherent in the principles.

be centered on the philosophy

Employing a methodology that conceives of

the novel as a medium from which learning principles are to be distilled
and extracted permits the focus of this analysis to be on the movement
from the validation of the premises to the unfolding of the principles.
From within the novel, the implications for educational theory will be
realized through the development of specific learning principles.
Goethe injected the elements of his epistemology into the lit
erary composition of the novel.

As a result, Werther became the proto

type for Goethe's theory of knowledge.

Schaub (1933) addressed the

following remarks in observance of the centennial of Goethe's death:
Nevertheless, we may say of him, as of other thinkers who
exhibit less change and diversity, that certain of his
major doctrines and leading ideas were rooted in and
express a nature which was at least relatively permanent
and which manifested itself both within and throughout
the flux and shiftings of passing years (p. 145).
The epistemological framework that Goethe constructed for the novel
Werther was' to be the permanent structure upon which he built his
literary corpus.

In order to pursue a critical examination of

Werther's self and his relationships, research questions will be
formulated by identifying major learning concepts and premises
within the fabric of the novel itself.
posited in this study are as follows:

The nature of the questions
(a) What is the responsibility

of the human will in the learning process?
bility of the self to itself?

(b) What is the responsi

(c) What did Goethe recognize as being

fundamental to the growth process?

(d) What are the educational impli

cations of identifying the learning act as a process of selfexamination? and (e) What is the nature of the responsibility
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inherent in freedom of choice?

These questions, based on Goethe's pre

mises concerning the human will, the self, responsibility, choice, and
growth will guide the analysis and interpretation of the novel.

After

revealing the facets of his epistemology, Goethe's educational prin
ciples will be brought, to the surface and subsequently explained.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH

Interpretation of the Novel
If there is to be any understanding of the novel's epistemo
logical structure as erected by Goethe, a ciitical study of the char
acter Werther is essential.

It is Werther's response to events, as

well as his relationships with others and with his own self, which
reflect the premises of Goethe's theory of learning.
Goethe presents the confrontation of Werther with the problem
of the human will and its function in the letter of May 22, 1771.
Werther reflects on the following:
That the life of man is but a dream is a though** which has
occurred to many people, and I myself am constantjlv haunted
by it. When I see the limitations which imprison the active
and speculative faculties of man; when I see how all human
activity is directed toward procuring satisfaction for needs
that have no other purpose than prolonging our mfserable
existence; when I see, moreover, how any comfort we may
derive from certain points of inquiry is merely a dream
like kind of resignation, in which we paint our prison walls
with gaily colored figures and luminous prospects— all this,
Wilhelm, leaves me speechless.
I withdraw into my inner
self and there discover a world— a world, it is true, rather
of vague perceptions and dim desires than of creative power
and vital force. And then everything swims before my senses,
and I go on smilxng at the outer world like someone in a
dream (Goethe 1971, pp. 11-12).
Werther is lamenting the fact that his inner world lacks clarity and
substance.

It is a world of imagination to which is opposed the outer

world of reality.

Because Werther rejects any relation with reality,

he is caught between both worlds.

He seems to be acting from premises
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that ate based upon phantoms of his own fabrication.

It is comfortable

for Werther to react and respond in such a ma>ner since he has no real
conception of his inner nature, and he denies any participation in the
external realm of existence.

Werther's failure as a man, then, is his

refusal to accept the inherent epistemological responsibility for deter
mining and giving essence to the inner world of the self.

His bitter

complaint in regard to the limitations of mankind has only a scant foun
dation,

In actuality, the confinement that Werther thinks he has

uncovered and justly denounced is self-imposed.

That the life of man

appears as merely an image in the mind of Werther accents the absence
of a process of intellective validation resting upon an empirical base.
A complimentary passage that further reveals the nature of
Werther's perception is the episode with the youthful farm hand.
Werther immediately empathizes with the country lad's amorous plight.
The young man describes with passionate subjectivity the features and
qualities of the x<?idow by x**hom he is employed.

Werther is overcome

by his emotions and concludes the letter of May 30, 1771, with the
following statement:
I shall try to see her as soon as possible, or rather, after
giving it a second thought, I shall avoid her. It is better
that I see her through the eyes of her lover; she might not
appear to my own eyes, in reality, as I now see her; and x^hy
should I destroy the lovely image I already possess? (Goethe
1971, p. 20).
Werther is again turning away from what is real toward a xrorld of emorional fantasy.

This is the way he intends to keep matters.

he is insistent upon if reality is to be fended off.

It. is what

Werther’s eventual

relationship xv'ith Lotce will be based not on the true nature of her own
self but rather on his self-concei\ed image of her inner character.
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Werther!s reference to the insubstantial quality of the world
about him is delineated to his confidant in the letter of July 18,
1771:
Wilhelm, what would the world mean to our hearts without
love! What is a magic lantern without its lamp! As soon
as you insert the little lamp, then the most colorful pic
tures are thrown on your white wall. And even though they
are nothing but fleeting phantoms, they make us happy as
we stand before them like little boys, delighted at the
miraculous visions (Goethe 1971, pp, 47-48).
Werther is confronting the domain of reality with that of appearance.
Like the shackled prisoners described by Plato (1941/1965, chap. 25)
in the cave allegory, Werther observes but does not perceive.
sees exactly what he wants to see and

He only

thereby excludes the will’s

insistence that his self experience what it confronts.

If the legit

imacy of its emotions are not questioned and validated, the heart too
will provide only reflections and visions.
process of evaluation.

Perception implies a

In other words, there is the empirical need

for relationships to develop in order for the mind to become, more
fully conscious.

Confrontation with the reiallty of existence, rather

than a mode of self-acquiescence, is demanded by the will whenever the
intellective process is fully in balance.
In the letter of August 8, 1771, Goethe portrays the extent to
which Werther has succumbed to the process of rationalization.

Several

questions are posed by Werther in the following paragraph:
But can you demand it of the unhappy man whose whole life
is slowly and irremediably wasting away of a lingering
disease; c^n you demand that he should make a definite end
of his misery by the stab of a dagger? And does not the
disease, at the very same time that it burns up his strength,
also destroy the courage he needs to free himself from it?
(Goethe 1971, p. 54).
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Werther wants to convince himself that his malady and suffering are the
result of an external determinant.

He believes his misfortune to be

analogous to the physical problem of disease and desires to feel as if
he has no control over the matter itself or its implications.

In his

essay on Werther, Mann (1941/1968, p. 344) elucidates Werther's situa
tion through an analysis of Goethe’s intention with respect to events
in the novel.

Mann, concentrating on the character of Werther as hero

and correspondent, claims that Werther is young Goethe himself.

Sig

nificantly absent in Werther, however, is the creative talent with
which nature endowed the living Goethe.

Werther has no other mission

on earth besides his suffering in life, concludes Mann, and so he has
to perish.

Mann’s analysis implies that Goethe was equating the crea

tive act with the learning act.

Learning is the realization of new

relationships and the subsequent actualization of their potentialities.
Creativity is the development of new potentiality between relationships.
If Werther is, as Mann suggests, the figure of Goethe but without his
ability for creativity, what remains is an individual who is minus the
will to learn, or grow, or create.
when he no longer grows.

The implication is that man dies

He stops living when he stops growing.

stop the growth process, as in the case of Werther, is suicide.

To
Goethe

was aware that all learning is creative in essence because the self, as
a self-determiner, is constantly involved in the process of designing
its future.

Learning and living are the recognition and the accept

ance of the need to never stop.
riencing the learning process.

The self must will to live

by expe

Graham (1973) identified this notion

of Goethe's and succinctly wrote that "'he lived in order to write"
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(p. 135).

Writing was a learning process, in the case of Goethe, through

which both he and his reading public were educated.

Although Werther, in

his letter of August 8, 1771, makes reference to the similarity of his
condition to that of an individual with an incurable disease, there is
actually no physical reason for him to die.

Werther has no choice,

therefore, but to take his own life if he is to die.

His turmoil is

self-imposed, and Werther realizes that his sorrows alone are not cap
able of depriving him of the courage necessary to free himself from such
tumult.

Mann (1941/1968, p. 348) considers the struggle with this

dilemma as one of the strongest motives for Werther's suicide.

Although

he may strongly desire to relinquish all sense of control to an external
force, Werther vaguely recognizes that even the will to be determined
has its source within the self.

Ultimately it is alwayi the internal

which brings about that which the self wills.
In the conclusion of his letter of August 8, 1771, Werther men
tions how he happened upon his diary, which he had temporarily disre
garded.

He writes, "I am amazed how I ran into this situation with

full awareness, step by step.

How clearly I have seen my condition,

yet how childishly I have acted.

How clearly I still see it, and yet

show no signs of improvement" (Goethe 1971, p. 54).

In yet another

passage, Werther's heightened sense of awareness and ability to selfanalyze is clearly in evidence.

The letter is dated November 3, 1772,

and occurs in the second part of the novel.

Werther declares:

Oh, if I only could have moods, could shift the blame on the
weather, a third person, or on an unsuccessful enterprise,
then only half the weight of this unbearable burden of dis
content would rest on me. Miserable me!
I know only tec
well that the fault is with me alone— not fault! Enough,
the source cf all my misery is hidden in myself as was for
merly the source of all my happiness (Goethe 1971, p p . 113—
114).
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Werther has an awareness of his condition, but he lacks any control over
it.

3y allowing his self to succumb to the process of rationalization,

Werther has willed chat he become a fully determined being.

He possesses

knowledge and, as a result, knows what he should do but refuses to act
accordingly.

It is the responsibility inherent in awareness to develop,

expand, and generate a greater depth of consciousness within the mind in
order to realize the meaning and application of knowledge.

Peterson

(1970) addresses a similar problem when he discusses the "cycle of con
sciousness" in the following paragraph:
The cycle of consciousness is an important factor in the psy
chological make-up of the learner. As a construct it carries
with it the realization that learning builds upon previous
learning, in a sense, gathering momentum as each fact is
added to what is in the process of becoming a whole. An
integral part of this process is the developing conscious
ness which accompanies the comprehension of meaning and under
standing. To understand meaning is to be conscious of its
application and implication. Learning and its spirit is the
originator of the value condition. To place value upon a fact
is to find relevancy in that fact; this is its condition.
From within the cycle of consciousness the value condition
prompts the learner to question the reliability and validity
of the material of knowledge.
It determines the importance
of the subject for the learner. To determine importance is
to recognize the applicability of the subject to a personal
need. Thus, the spirit of learning motivates and permits the
cycle of consciousness to fulfill its purpose (pp. 52-53).
Peterson implies a need for the will to act from an empirical base.

This

recognition of the cognitive domain is entirely supplanted by Werther
with a realm of emotion and feeling.

The problem, however, is not that

of the cognitive in opposition, to the affective but rather of determin
ing the legitimacy of that feeling and emotion.

There must be a reason,

a purpose, and a sense of control in both the cognitive and affective
domains.

What Werther failed to do was to validate with his own mind

and thereby establish a relationship between the cognitive and affective
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constructs of the mind.

Because he did not build an empirical structure

on which his will could act, Werther was Incapable of validating the
specificity of objects for himself.
Eventually and irrevocably the consumption of Werther's entire
being commences.

In the powerful and intense letter of December 6,

1772, the link that bridges Werther with the world of reality becomes
a mere thread.

Werther cries out in his agony over Lotte:

How her image haunts met Awake or asleep, she fills my
entire being. Here, when I close my eyes, here, in my
forehead, at the focus of my inner vision, her dark ayes
remain. Here! but I cannot put it into words. When I
close my eyes, they are there; like an ocean, like an
abyss, they lie before me, in me, taking hold of all my
thoughts (Goethe 1971, p. 124).
Werther has become a fully determined being; that is, he is being lived
by external determinants rather than living according to his own powers
of self-determination.

Through the process of rationalization, his

intellective processes were not permitted to feed his will with crite
ria based on honesty.

He sealed his own fate by consuming nothing but

untruth and therefore relinquished his freedom.

At this point of total

dishonesty with himself, Werther renounced his responsibility to the
self.

He had willed that his self become externally determined.

Goethe's method of conveying this message to the reader is to have
the. "editor," at this particular juncture, assume the responsibility
of directly transmitting the final course of events within the novel.
Peterson (1977c), in his book on the human will, states the nature of
the relationship between the will and responsibility in these terms:
While the learner may be subject to determinants, external or
internal in nature, it is intellective stance (the total intel
lective process) which governs whether or not he will allow
himself to be determined, or will exert his intellectual and
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willful powers of nelf-determination.
It is our contention
that responsibility, as we are using it here, is rightfully
assumed only when the powers of self-determination ar a exer
cised (p. 20).
Of course, Werr.her's powers of self-determination have been willfully
depleted, and Peterson (1977c) reminds the reader of the following:
The degree of responsibility will be in keeping with the
degree of awareness found in the consciousness of the
learner. How conscious is he of his responsibility as
a self-determiner? Without this consciousness, the will
will realize that the mind subjects itself to determinants
which may assume all responsibility for what is done (p. 20).
In this case, it is the process of rationalization to which the mind of
Werther yields.

Engelberg (1972) seems to generally concur with this

assessment of Werther's predicament as indicated in the following state
ment :
[Werther is] in quest of the increasing certainty that there
is some unity of being, some correspondence, as it was later
to be called, between perception (consciousness) and knowl
edge (conscience), between what a man felt and what he
valued, One may put the last; point even more emphatically:
what a man feels must be of value (p. 74),
In other words, the knowledge that resides in consciousness carries value
as its meaning is revealed through the empirical thrusts of awareness
(conscience).

Rather than will a confrontation with his consciousness

in order to validate this knowledge fur himself, Werther continues to
impose a system of values determined by the rationalization process.
therefore wills a perception which the truth of awareness would deny.
Engelberg (1972) acknowledges Werther*s self-deception and states the
following:
He alone bestows values, and it is the terrible disparity
between perception and value that destroys his quest for
unity and hai*mony. After all the point is that Werther’s
"distemper" is a symptom of his frustration, bis inability,

He
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finally, to unite perception and knowledge, for knowledge
relentlessly contravenes whatever value he places— or
forces— upon his perceptions (p. 75),
Consequently, Werther’s will functions upon a foundation of untruth that
permits him neither to learn nor to grow.
It is apparent that Werther does not possess a clear sense of
responsibility toward his self.

Following his initial encounter with

Lotte, Werther declares, in the letter of June 19, 1771, that "for me
there is neither day or night, and the entire universe about me has
ceased to exist" (Goethe 1971, p. 32).

Although he has not determined

the value or meaningfulness of this relationship, Werther begins to
regard Lotte as his sole reason for existence.

In fact, several weeks

later, on July 1, 1771, Werther exclaims, "0 angel, for your sake I
must live!" (Goethe 1971, p. 41).

If Werther is not even able to live

for himself, than how can he live for the sake of another?

Since

Werther perceives Lotte and the rest of the world not as they really
are but as he wishes and desires them to be, lie would be living a
life of contradiction.

By willing to be dishonest with himself,

Werther refuses to accept the demands of responsibility.
quence of such £i course of action is obvious.

The conse

In the second part of

the novel, on the evening of October 27, 1772, Werther dishearteningly
observes, "I have so much in me, and the feeling for her absorbs it
all; I have so much, and without her it all comes to nothing" (Goethe
1971, p. 113).

Werther is suffering from his abdication of responsi

bility toward the self.

An observation is offered by Peterson (1977c):

"It is only the self-determined mind which is willing to accept respon
sibility for its actions; and, of course, responsibility accepted as
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such, is the working hypothesis from which the intellective process
moves” (p. 99).

Werther has willed, however, that the movement of his

intellective process be subject to the demands of external determinants.
A rather peculiar allusion is made by Werther, in the letter of
July 16, 1771, when he asserts that "a secret force [eine geheime Kraft]
drives me forward again, although everything swims before my eyes"
(Goethe 1971, p. 46).

A suggestion consistent with Werther's character

would identify this concealed force as his will.

It is a will that is

activated by a mind that lacks its self-corrective measure.

Peterson

(1977c) provides the following comment:
While it is the mind which rationalizes, it is also the mind
which serves as its own self-corrective; one of the largest
areas of responsibility lies in studying the many faces of
rationalization. This is not to suggest that the mind is
at odds with this ever-present activity; it simply demands
to be in control of it. The mind, then, makes a distinction
between the cognitive process and the processes of rationali
zation. It is rationalization which must be tested by the
cognitive process and ultimately the entire intellective
process, including the affective and conative (p. 15).
Werther is essentially being driven by a will which he has not accepted
the responsibility to validate.
A glaring paradox is evident in the letter of July 20, 1771.
In his reply to Wilhelm, Werther asks:
Am I not now active? and does it make any real difference
whether I count peas or lentils? As everything in the
world amounts after all to nothing to speak of, a person
who drudges for the sake of others, for money or honors
or what not, without following his own ambition, his own
need, is always a fool (Goethe 1971, p. 49).
In order for Werther to realize and validate his own needs and ambitions,
it is necessary for him to establish a relationship to the self.
Peterson (1970) writes the following explanation:
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For man to be the subject of personal human reaction is to
take it for granted that the self exists; but how he exists
and why changes his relationship Jo the self. What is_ the
self then becomes the most important concern of the indiidual. To ask: who am I? and find the answer is to real
ize that the goal of the individual is to be able to iden
tify with the self (p. 14).
It is not possible for Werther to know his self because he has denied
himself the responsibilities inherent in self-determination.

Ortega

(1949/1968), in reference to Werther's notion of activity, personifies
the phenomenon of life in an imaginary conversation with Werther and
exclaims, " 'It is not enough to act; you have to make your
lutely individual destiny.

your abso

You have to make up your mind irremediably.

To live fully is to be something irrevocably'" (p. 167).

Ortega is

speaking of the will to design, or realize, the relationship to the
self.

As a fully determined being, Werther does not will to experi

ence, to know, or to learn.

He devices the meaning of the world

because he places no value on his own existence in it.
Wilhelm has written concerning the strained and precarious rela
tionship between Lotte and Werther.

On August 8, 1771, Werther answers

the argument of his confidant and maintains the following:
In this world we are seldom faced with an Either-Or; all
emotions and modes of actions show as many varieties of
shape and shading as exist between a hooked nose and one
that is turned up. So you won't be angry with me when I
grant your whole argument, and yet continue in my attempt
to slip in between the Either and the Or (Goethe 1971,
p. 53).
Werther is rationalizing again.

He does not comprehend that the need and

responsibility to choose is decisive.

Peterson (1970) writes the follow

ing:
[Man] exit's as a man because he possesses the power and
insight found in choice. Whatever he does is the result
of choice; this is one thing he is unable to escape.
It
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determines his relationship to the self as well as to others;
it is the key of his detemunac ive powers of consciousness.
. . . Man creates his own life and does this by finding mean
ing in all of existence; he does this by means of using the
opportunities afforded him in choice (p. 17).
Werther stagnates and decays because his mind is so determined that it
lacks the freedom and will to make a valid choice.
On August 22, 1771, Werther astutely comments, "If we fail our
selves, evt_iything fails us" (Goethe 1971, p. 67).

He lacks a basic

faith in himself and is unable to value and find meaning.

Peterson

(1970) realizes that "freedom provides the setting out of which values
evolve. . . . Meaning is found when value is realized; value is real
ized only because freedom exercises its responsibilities to the self"
(p. 15).

Werther has lost his freedom and given up the attendant

responsibilities inherent in freedom.

In the same letter he continues:

The minister has liked me for a long time, and has fre
quently urged me to devote myself to some work; and some
times, for an hour or so, it seems the thing to do. But
when I come to consider it a little later, I remember the
fable of the horse which, tired of its freedom, let itself
be harnesssed and was ridden to death (Goethe 1971, pp. 6768).
Whether he actually works or not is of little concern, for in neither
case is Werther free.

His self-imposed limitations have in effect

"saddled and harnessed" his own self.
As the second part of the novel proceeds, Werther renounces all
sense of accountability to himself and others.
on March 24, 1772, the following words:
ter pill for my mother.

He writes to Wilhelm,

"And therefore-— sugar the bit

I cannot help myself, and she must put up with

the fact that I cannot help her either" (Goethe 1971, p. 93).

Werther

acknowledges now that he will act, as he previously did, without fully
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validating Che reasons for his actions.
neous and impulsive.

His reactions will be sponta

Rationalization and dishonesty have reached such

a proportion in Werther that he is reluctant to blame himself for what
is happening.

It is easy for him to make these statements of surrender

and deception because all that he has to do is point toward some exter
nal factor that has supposedly led to his downfall.

Underneath this

facade, though, Werther dimly recognizes that it is really what is
inside him (the internal) that is out of balance.

At the end of the

letter of August 18, 1771, lie inserts the fallowing message of despair:
My heart is instead worn out by the consuming power latent
in the whole of Nature which has formed nothing that will
not destroy its neighbor and itself. So I stagger with
anxiety, Heaven and Earth and their weaving powers around
me! I see nothing but an eternally devouring and ruminat
ing monster (Goethe 1971, p. 66).,
f
Vlhat Werther sees, in reality, is a reflection of his self.

He is dis

integrating and feeding his own consumptive process very rapidly.
Werther literally devours himself, and the pace continues until the
"editor" finally has to directly continue relating the course of the
novel.
Floundering in the emptiness of his self, Werther sends an
intense and emotionally charged letter to Wilhelm on November 15,
1772.

He asks:

And why must I be ashamed at the terrible moment when my
whole life trembles between being and not-being; when the
past flashes like lightning over the gloomy abyss of the
future and everything around me collapses, and the world
is destroyed with roe*-is it not then the voice of a crea
ture thrown completely on his own resources, who has
failed himself and is resistlessly plunging into the
abyss, that grinds out the cry, "My God! My God! why
hast Thou forsaken me?" (Goethe 1971, p, 116),
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Because he has not established a responsible relationship to his self,
Werther is again attempting to transfer the cause of his sufferings onto
an external determinant.

As a determined and unfree, being, he denies

ilruost all responsibility for the condition of his life.

Werther feels

that he is alone in the world,and his lack of control over the forces
that confront him only increase his sense of helplessness and impend
ing doom.
Goethe powerfully depicts the relationship between responsibility
and the self in the letter of November 30, 1772.

Werther is confronted

by a man named Heinrich, who has lost his sanity (because of an unre
quited love for Lotte), and he probes the peculiar nature of this man by
means of conversation.

Heinrich's mother soon arrives in search of her

son, and Werther takes this opportunity to ask for an explanation con
cerning one of Heinrich's statements.

Werther wants to know the follow

ing:
"What did he mean when he spoke of a time when he was so
happy and well off?”— "The foolish fellow!" she cried,
with a compassionate smile, "by that he means the time
when he was out of his mind; he always praises those
days; it was when he wa3 at the asylum and did not know
himself" (Goethe 1971, p, 121).
Heinrich had become mentally crippled because he no longer recognized
his own self.

His happiness was part of the paradisiacal delusion that

his self had surrendered to while in the asylum.

Werther was now set

face to face with the realization that by not accepting the responsibil
ity to know the self, the path leading tower;! madness or eventual suicide
was inevitable.
to man:

Peterson (1970) makes the following statement in regard
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His greatest problem is to know himself. Meaningfully, he
cannot know the world of persons and things and understand
their implicative values until his studied reactions have
affected his experiential constructs. To know himself as an
individual means his mind is open to all of the possible con
frontations of the morrow; he is aware of the meaningfulness
of internal experiences, what is happening around him, as well
as those things which may have an effect upon his existence
Cpp. 16-17).
Werther refused the responsibility of self-confrontation and chose to
turn away from it.

Ultimately he imprisoned himself in his own world

of rationalization and was left with only the expedient of suicide by
which to flee his entrapment.
A self-determined mind is a mind that has willed to choose.
Inherent in choice is a great deal of responsibility.

It is the knowl

edge that the self can become known and defined only by means of the
creative element of choice.

Peterson (1970) clarifies this notion with

a single question and answer:
What does it mean to assume the rola of creation and recog
nize the underlying responsibilities inherent in making a
choice? It is done by questioning the meaning of one's own
existence, but first knowing what it means to exist and what
is required by the mind to determine its own validity
(pp. 14-15).
Goethe deals with this matter in the character of Werther.

Very early

ir. the novel, on May 13, 1771, Werther reveals to his friend Wilhelm
that, "I treat my poor heart, moreover, as though it were a sick child
and satisfy all its desires" (Goethe 1971, pp. 7-8).

In other words,

it is the heart, or the affective, which is determining the actions and
behavior of Werther.

lie does not understand that it is the nature of

the relationship between the cognitive and the affective that permits
the will to act.
domain.

Werther must determine the legitimacy of the affective

It is only when the cognitive, affective, and conative domains
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of the intellect are in balance that the mind's self-corrective process
will properly function.

Without the function of self-correction, Werther

cannot be assured of making the valid choices required for the process of
self-determination.
Peterson (.1970) writes that "freedom is the opportunity to think
and to act freely" (p. 16).

It would appear that Werther is subscribing

to such a notion in two of his letters.

On May 22, 1771, he concludes

with a discussion on mankind and the world by remarking, "And, then, how
ever confined he [man] may be, he still holds forever in his heart the
sweet feeling of freedom, and knows that he can leave this prison when
ever he likes" (Goethe 1971, p. 13).

In the second part of the novel,

on March 16, 1772, Werther sends the following description:
Today I have taken up a knife a dozen times, intending to
relieve with it my suffocating heart. I have been told
that a noble bread of horses, when overheated and hunted
almost to death, will by instinct bite open a vein and so
recover their breath.
I often feel the same. I should
like to open one of my veins and gain eternal freedom for
myself (Goethe 1971, p. 92).
Are these statements by Werther, however, actually examples of the con
cepts of freedom and free choice?

Peterson (1977c) suggests that "it is

the individual who must be free to act, and when he does act, what he
has done has been done freely, and the free action then has been
chosen. . . .

If the action is not free, the choice likewise cannot

be free" (p. 88).

He explains further that "it is the depth of poten

tial freedom which gives to value its meaning.

Then, when a choice is

made from among alternatives, it is willed because of what the choice
can come to mean because of the degree of freedom it can bring to the
mind" (Peterson 1977c, p. 93).

Werther does not have enough faith in
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mankind to realize "hat. life is confinement and the world is a prison
only if man determines it to be so.

He is content to be manipulated

and controlled by external forces and events, secure in the belief that
he can rationalize his own self-destruction.

In an explanation appli

cable to Wertherfs dilemma, Peterson (1977c) states:

"If the mind is

not a self-determiner, then it is determined by conditions which take
from it both authority and responsibility.

This implies there is no

freedom of choice, nor is there potentiality for freedom" (p. 93).
Werther is not free because he has willed to lead a life based on, and
determined by, dishonesty and untruth.

In distinction to his reference

about the noble horses, Werther’s condition is of his own making
(choice).
Werther relates a discussion concerning the conflicting senti
ments between himself and Albert over the issue of suicide.

On August 12,

1771, he writes:
"Why must people like you," I exclaimed, "when you discuss
any action, immediately say:
'This is foolish, this is wise;
this is good, that is bad!’ And what does it all mean? Does
it mean that you have really discovered the inner circum
stances of an action? Do you know how to explain definitely
the reason why it happened, why it had to happen?" (Goethe.
1971, p. 57).
Werther seems to recognize that there are causes of certain forces and
events over which the self has absolutely no control.

Yet, at the same

time, he refuses to admit that the self does have control over the impli
cations of cause if it exercises its responsibility of free choice.
Peterson (1970) insists on the following:
To be human is to recognize the potentiality of choice. . . .
And to think he [man] can escape any part of existence is not
a problem; the problem lies in what he brings by way of men
tal and spiritual ammunition to the confrontation. To
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determine the validity of these needs is to emphasize the
futility of even playing with the concept of escape; no one
can escape from the self. Rather, to meet every confronta
tion ably prepared is his task (p. 17).
Werther thinks that he can escape from his self through suicide.

He

chooses not to accept the responsibility of affecting the implications
of cause that confront him.

To be a self-determiner would upset the

comfort and security of Werther's irrational (in the sense of mentally
closed) existence.
When the opportunity for free choice is obstructed, man begins
to suffer from a loss of humanness. In a letter dated January 20, 1772,
k
and sent to Wilhelm, Werther confides:
■ • -v

V
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,

How dried up my senses are getting to be; not for one min
ute does my heart overflow— not one blissful hour! Nothing!
Nothing! I seem to be standing before a sort of raree show,
watching the little men and little horses jerk before my
eyes; and I often ask myself if everything is not an optical
illusion. I join in the play or, rather, I am moved about
like a marionette, and sometimes, when I grasp the wooden
hand of my neighbor, I shrink back with a shudder (Goethe
1971, p. 84).
This is the despairing plight of a fully determined being.

Werther does

not have the freedom to assess the value of life or the value of his fel
low man.

Peterson (1977c) proposes that "man does not possess dignity

if he is not free to make choices, and do so as a self-determining mind;
the will is free only in the self-determined mind" (p. 101).

Werther is

unable to dialogue or feel a sense of mutuality in his relationships with
himself or others.

His will is not free to validate the nature of any of

his relationships and, consequently, meaning and purpose have no applica
tion for him.
Shortly before the "editor" assumes the obligation of directly
relating the final events in Goethe's novel, Werther's facade begins to
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weaken.

He has a growing awareness of what he is suffering from and

cries out to his confidant in the letter dated November 30, 1772, "I
cannot, I cannot regain my balance!

Wherever I go I am faced with an

apparition which completely upsets me.
(Goethe 1971, p. 119).

Today! 0 Destiny! 0 Mankind!"

This vision which Werther faces, as if he is

looking into a mirror, is a reflection of the truth that he has been
denying for too long.

It is a truth that lies far below the surface

of Werther's self-imposed facade.

Peterson (iy/7c) asserts the follow

ing:
It is only the self-determined mind which is free to choose
its epistemological destiny. Since it is either determined,
or becomes a self-determiner, and what is determined cannot
be free, the mind, if it wills to be free must first will to
be self-determined. Freedom is the opportunity to make use
of the potentialities of the mind; when it makes use of these
opportunities, it is exercising its option of responsibility
and acts morally (p. 48).
The effect of what this truth would mean and demand if Werther saw it in
terms of its reality and its implications would be overwhelming.

Werther,

in fact, ultimately suffers from this disparity between the freedom of
self-determination and the untruth of rationalization.

Goethe's Epistemology
That Goethe wrote Werther for reasons other than the mere presen
tation of an entertaining autobiographical novel of unrequited love is of
great significance.

He himself writes of his intention in the thirteenth

chapter of the Autobiography:
It cannot be expected of the public that it should receive an
intellectual work [ein geistiges Werk] intellectually.
In
fact, it was only the subject, the material part that was con
sidered, as I had already found to be the case Cutong my own
friends; while at the same time arose that old prejudice,
associated with the dignity of a printed book,— that it ought
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tc have a moral aim [einen didaktlschen Zweckj . But a true
picture of life has none. It neither approves nor censures,
but develops sentiments and actions in their consequences,
and thereby enlightens and instructs [erleuchtet und belehrt]
(Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 219-220).
In order to ascertain the manner and content of Goethe’s enlightenment
and instruction, it is necessary to fit together the epistemological
pieces that are dispersed within the context of his short novel.
Goethe’s foremost concern in life was the search for, and realiza
tion of, his own self.

Ortega (1950) is convinced that "Goethe traversed

his life in search of Goethe, in search of that figure of himself which
he felt called upon to realize, to bring into the real" (p. 356).
Schweitzer (1950/1961) writes, "From adolescence to old age, he [Goethe]
is profoundly ana seriously concerned with himself" (p. 60).

Eecon (1934)

is in agreement with these observations and offers the following support:
The education and expression of self were, after all, the
dominant interests of his [Goethe's] life and in all his
daily activities as well as in all his works, in his plays,
novels, conversations, and diaries, in these "fragments of
a great confession," we find abundant evidence of this
fact (p. 148).
Goethe did indeed mention repeatedly how important knowledge of the self
was.

In a letter to von Leonhard, dated October 12, ISO/, he remarks

that "there would be much less disputing about objects of knowledge,
their derivation and explanation, I am convinced, if everyone knew him
self above all" (Goethe 1949, p. 116).

Goethe (1949) similarly declares,

in the essay "Shakespeare and No End," that "the highest stage man can
reach is to be conscious of his own thoughts and sentiments, to know him
self" (pp. 204-205).

The sixteenth book of Goethe's Autobiography con

tains a passage in which are cited the adverse consequences of inhibiting
the realization of the self:
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Our physical as well as our social life, manners, customs,
worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, and many an acciden
tal event, all call upon us to deny ourselves. Much that
is most inwardly peculiar to us we are not allowed to
develop; much that we need from without for the completion
of our character is withheld; while, on the. other hand, so
much is forced upon us which is as alien to us as it is
burdensome. We are robbed of all we have laboriously
acquired for ourselves, or friendly circumstances have
bestowed upon us; and, before we can see clearly what we
are, we find, ourselves compelled to part with our person
ality, piece by piece, till at last it is gone altogether
(Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 307-308).
This notion of understanding the self was crucial for Goethe's episte
mology.

It was the foundation from which the structure of his entire

philosophy would arise.
Goethe was aware that m a n ’s most salient confrontation was with
the self.

The problem that resulted was that man has got to use the

self in order to define it.

It is in the interaction of relationships

that the self acts most distinctly.

Bergstraesser (1960), in an article

that considers Goethe’s idea of a new society, stresses the concept of
relationships and asserts that "his [Goethe’s] will to reform begins
with man’s relation to others and to himself" (p. 38).

Goethe (1949)

himself maintains that "man knows himself only in so far as he knows
the world, becoming aware of it only in himself, and of himself only
in it" (p. 207).

Willoughby (1950) echoes Goethe’s sentiments concern

ing the nature of relationships and responds that "it is only by finding
oneself reflected in others that a man becomes conscious of his own
worth" (p. 18).

Willoughby (1950) continues and emphasizes that Goethe

was definitely aware of "the heightened consciousness of existence which
comes from seeing ourselves reflected in the lives of others" (p. 27).
Dieckmann (1962b), in accordance with these statements, acknowledges
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"Goethe's firm belief that man understands himself only if he sees him
self reflected in the outside world" (p. 173).

In one of his many

aphorisms Goethe (1949) cautions, "Keep a moderate watch upon yourself
in order that you may become aware of your relations as regards your
fellow-men and the world" (p. 209).

He also adds, in a letter to

Auguste Stolberg, dated February 13, 1775, "One does not get to know
that one exists until one rediscovers oneself in others" (Goethe 1949,
p. 159).

In the fourteenth chapter of the Autobiography, Goethe reit

erates his contention that the self is known only through the nature of
the relationships that it establishes with others.

He provides the fol

lowing comment about man:
9

*

1

If he wishes to form a just and independent judgment, he
must, before all things, convince himself of the worth of
his fellow citizens; he must learn to know them; he must
Inquire into their sentiments and their capacities; and
thus, in aiming to read others, he becomes intimate with
his own bosom (Goethe 1969, Vol. 2, p. 242).
Because this confrontation of the self with itself and with other selves
is a cyclical process, Goethe had come to the realization that the rela
tionships he participated in with others were totally dependent upon the
nature of the relationship he had with himself.

Without acknowledging

this factor, he could not progress further in his growth and episte
mological development.
What does this intensive concentration by Goethe on the self and
the qualities of a relationship imply?
answer.

Goethe himself gives a succinct

He replies through the character Ottilia, in the novel. Elective

Affinities, that "the proper study of mankind is man" (Goethe 1949,
p. 157).
declares:

In a conversation with his secretary Eckermann, Goethe (1949)
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I have always regarded a nan as a self-contained individual
whom it was up to me to explore and cose to know in his
pecularity, without demanding any sympathetic response on
his part. By this means 1 have learned how to handle all
sorts of men; and it is only in this way that one comes to
know the varieties of human character and learns how to get
on in life (p. 154).
A passage from Goethe's novel Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship concisely
states, "The most interesting object to man is man; perhaps he should be
the exclusive object of interest" (Goethe 1949, p. 159).

The focal point,

then, is man and how he comes to know himself through the relationships
he establishes in life.

Schweitzer (1950/1961), in his 1949 address at

Aspen, Colorado, in commemoration of the bicentenary of Goethe's birth,
captured the essence of Goethe's lifelong pursuit when he declared,
"Goethe's work, therefore, is concerned with the philosophy of a genuine
and profoundly healthy hunc’- understanding” (p. 42).

Goethe is asking

man to recognize and understand himself in order that he may be able to
assume the human responsibilities of self-examination and selfdetermination.
To know the self is to realize the good.

Goethe (1949) writes,

in a letter to von Knebel, dated April 8, 1812, that "we act well,
strictly speaking, only in so far as we are acquainted with ourselves.
If we are. in the dark concerning ourselves we are not likely to succeed
in doing what is good in the right way, which amounts to the good not
being done at all" (p. 204).

In other words, the self must intend the

good by recognizing the Inherent implications residing in choice.
Peterson (1977c) explains that "intention wants me to make the best
possible choice. . . .

It is intention which constantly suggests the

need, r.ot so much to make a choice, as to make the best possible choice,
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taking ail conditions into consideration" (p. 97).
an end.

Choice is a means to

It is an end not in the sense of finality, but rather it is an

end in a mode of continual transformation.

The self is saying that it

is never going to reach this end because it sees the potential within
to transcend, to move beyond the end.

It is the realization that choice

leads to growth and growth leads to self-enhancement.

Schweitzer (1949b)

expresses a similar understanding when he claims that "Goethe recognizes
that the way he must travel for himself is a way of self-improvement"
(p. 44).

In terms of his literary creations, "it is he himself who

appears ever and again in different forms, striving with an incorrup
tible sense of reality to find, through all his mistakes and failure,
the upward way" (Schweitzer 1949b, p. 44).

Schweitzer (1949b) contin

ues by admitting the following about Goethe:
He who saw even before Nietzsche that the great problem is
how man’s realization of nobility, which is self-realization,
and his achievement of goodness are related to each other—
and therein lies his own peculiar philosophical significance!—
adopted the simple solution, that true self-realization can
consist in nothing other than true realization of goodness
(pp. 50-51).
Goethe was also aware of the nature of the relationship between knowledge
of the self and realization of goodness brought about through learning.
Within the novel Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, he incorporates the
following paragraph:
I can take pleasure only in a mail who knows what is good for
himself and others and who works to limit his arbitrary cap
rice. Everyone's hands are at work molding his own fortune,
like the plastic artist shaping his raw material. But it is
with this art as with all others: The capacity is innate,
but only learning and solicitous effort bring it to fruition
(Goethe 1949, p. 164).
Goethe perceived as the responsibility of choice the creation of rela
tionships that are learning processes.

What is the nature of the
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'-ealization of this process?

Schweitzer (1949a) once again elucidates

this matter and concludes:
Therefore, the purpose of the world is fulfilled when every
single being fulfills his purpose, and I am free to abandon
all thought about the meaning of the world while I simply
devote myself to the thought that I must realize the meaning
of my own life. And, according to Goethe, the meaning of my
life is that I should develop the good that is in me. and
subdue the evil that tries to retard the good. This is
Goethe’s great teaching about the eternal (p. 97).
To attain and act on the good is to make a choice leading toward the ful
fillment of purpose in realizing the meaning of the self in its relation
ship to itself and to whatever it wills to confront in life.
What is needed at this point in Goethe’s philosophical evolution
is the epistemological connective between what is good and what is truth.
Goethe (1949) offers the following maxim:

"Love of truth asserts itself

in the ability to find and appreciate what is good wherever it be"
(p. 212).

What is true is good and, conversely, what is good is true.

Heller (1971) suggests that "truth is what man is meant to know— this is
the center of Goethe’s intellectual existence" (p. 30).,

It is the respon

sibility of man to search for, validate, and legitimize truth.

In

another of his aphoristic remarks, Goethe (1949) writes, "If I know my
relation to myself and the world about me, I call it Truth.

In this

way each individual can have his particular truch, and it is neverthe
less the same truth" (p. 165).

It is the same truth because the self

is simultaneously experiencing and constructing the a priori by means
of the will.

Since the intention of the a priori is to bring about the

fulfillment ar.d completion of the validated good, the will rejects any
object of confrontation that does not meet this criterion.

Schaub

illuminates this aspect of truth and presents his interpretation of
Goethe's maxim as follows:

(1933)
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For, each is a self-active and unique being and possesses
a world and a life distinctive of himself. On the other
hand, this world, however personal and individual, is
none the less the same as that experienced uniquely by
every other person (p. 147).
This world is a given (a priori) and a totality which the self perceives
in its confrontations and experiences in life.

As the self experiences,

meaning is realized, knowledge is obtained, and truth is identified.
Schweitzer (1950/1961) affirms that "truth for Goethe is the greatest
of all values.

’Truth is wisdom,* he asserts" (p. 44).

To know and

validate truth is to realize a major epistemological construct in the
structure of growth.
Goethe does much more than just provide the elements from which
to erect his philosophy of knowledge.

He also provides the clues with

which the entire procedure can be set in motion.

In his consideration

of Goethe’s learning theory, Roubiczek (1962) writes:
Our knowledge is never absolute; we have to recognize free
dom gradually in the course of experience; thus we can never
know whether our aims are entirely right. We can be justi
fied only by continual striving, by a constantly renewed
endeavor to reconcile our external actions with those inner
laws to which we hold (pp. 134-135).
Through continual striving the self is willing self-determination in its
confrontations.

By willing to constantly act, the self is able to valid

ate that which it internalizes.

It is this process by which the self

learns and grows and which Goethe offers for examination and self
utilization.
A key ingredient for further penetration into Goethe's episte
mology is offered by Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer.

Riemer (1949), who was

a professor and librarian at the Weimar gymnasium and later a joint exe
cutor of Goethe's posthumous works, makes the following diary entry con
cerning one of Goethe’s novels:
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Among the other criticisms which the Philistine reviewers
addressed to The Elective Affinities was this, that the
book did not make visible the conflict between duty and
inclination. Goethe's comment to me was the following:
"The conflict takes place behind the scenes, but it is
made clear that it must have taken place. The characters
behave like civilized people; despite their inner conflict
they observe an outer decorum. A moral struggle is never
a fit object of aesthetic representation. For either
morality triumphs or is defeated.
In the first case, there
is no reason to represent it; in the contrary case it is
shameful to be the direct witness. . . . In all such delin
eations, the sensual triumphs; but its triumph is avenged
by fate, that is, by the moral principle which rescues its
own freedom by death. Thus Werther had to shoot himself
after the senses had become his master. Thus Ottlie and
Eduard had to perish after they had given free rein to
their inclination. Therein consists the triumph of the
moral principle" (p. 172).
To have a duty towards something is to recognize an obligation.

In being

obligated, the self perceives the inherent potentiality in the nature of
whatever relationship it happens to establish.

By fulfilling it3 obliga

tion, the self realizes its responsibility in actualizing this potential
ity.

Meaningfulness is experienced by the self as it accepts its respon

sibility of acting on the object of confrontation.

What Goethe seems to

imply, then, is that the self has a duty, or obligation, towards the
moral principle.
morality.

This moral principle rests upon the foundation of

Peterson (1977c) explains the matter in the following lan

guage:
Morality is the value placed upon each existent in its crea
tion by First Cause, and which is reflected in each existent
as a potential to be known by the human mind as it makes the
value its own. Morality is the opportunity to experience the
purpose of creation by creation and actualizing its meaning.
The power of morality is lodged in the meaningfulness of the
learning momentum, by means of which the mind appropriates
unto itself the intentionality of First Cause (p, 50).
As a self-determiner, the self wills to experience whatever it chooses
to confront..

To experience .is to have determined meaning which is
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resident in cause.

Through internalization and the subsequent applica

tion of meaning, the self actualizes the potentiality in cause.

In

this manner, the self can validate that which is truth (the good) and
realize the intentionality of cause.

It is the absence of this process

of evaluation, in the sense of determining a value by experiencing mean
ing, that led Werther to his impending ruin.

The potential for self

enhancement was denied Werther because he refused to accept the demand
of the moral principle for growth.
Man, as Goethe well knew, does not live in a vacuum.

He does

not lead a naturally isolated existence but rather shares in, and
is an integral part of, a society.

This means that the self comes into

persistent contact with other selves.

Goethe recognized the episte

mological significance and potentiality in the interaction between two
distinct selves as he established hxs relationships throughout life.
Hutchins (1950) claims that "communication was the theme of Goethe's
life.

His friendships were really collaborations" (p. 390).

That

these relationships were actually learning processes is a fundamental
premise of Goethe's epistemology.

It is through the character Werther

that Goethe provides an examination of a self moving in contradiction
to this premise.

Wilkinson (1952/1962) provides the following analysis:

For Goethe, communication with the not-self, whether objects
or persons, is the task to which man is called and which— as
the author of Werther knew only too well--he relinquishes at
his peril. The very involvement of subject with world, which
is the condition of our existence, he sees as a challenge to
objectivity; not indeed as something out there independent of
us waiting to be "known," but as something ever to be created—
yet only to be created in collaboration with objects. . . .
Goethe's interest starts, in fact, where the epistemological
statement ends: reality is neither in the subject nor in the
object but in the activity between. His preoccupation is with
the practical management of that activity (pp. 136-137).
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Goethe recognized that as the potentiality residing in relationships was
actualized, the self gained a greater depth of consciousness.

The mean-

ingfulnesj of the knowledge possessed by the self increased and allowed
for a greater self-awareness.

But what was this pivotal activity that

permitted the intercourse and reciprocal interaction between two selves?
What was this mutual process which led to a collaborative system of
learning and growth?

Hutchins (1950) replies, "In one good Goethian

world the Civilization of the Dialogue might arise.
Civilization of the Dialogue is communication.

The essence of the

The Civilization of the

Dialogue presupposes mutual respect and understanding.
suppose agreement" (p. 400).
power in a relationship.

It does not pre

Dialogue is the self-generating source of

It is the self seeing its potentiality realized

by interaction with another self.

Dialogue does not inhibit self-

determination but rather promotes this process through mutuality.

One

of Goethe’s (1949) many aphorisms suggests, "The question to ask is not
whether we are perfectly agreed, but whether we are proceeding from a
common basis of sentiment" (p. 163).

Only through dialogue can mutual

ity be experienced, and to experience mutuality is to narticipate in the
dynamism of a creative relationship.
Goethe knew that the nature of his relationships were learning
processes which enabled the self to grow.

The manner in which he chose

tc design these relationships, however, determined their nature.

But

how did Goethe realize the kinds of choices necessary for him to grow?
permitted h*m to then act upon these choices?

Schweitzer (1949b)

recognizes this apparent predicament and offers the following solution:
"Goethe sees that the way he must take is this:

not to impose upon
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himself anything foreign to his nature, but to let whatever good lives
and smolders in him develop and to lay aside whatever is not good in
him" (p. 36).

In other words, Goethe had to discriminate between that

which did and that which did not carry value for him.

Goodheart (1968)

concurs with this assessment and adds the following:
Goethe is distinguished by his capacity for assimilation
and development: his life confirms the legend of his
catholicity. He makes rejections, but he absorbed— or
tried to absorb— everything of value that he had experi
enced (p. 74).
To experience that which he validated as having value for the self became
a process of osmosis and subsequent growth.

Goethe (1969), in the elev

enth chapter of his Autobiography, speaks of this matter:
Man may seek his higher destination on earth or in heaven,
in the present or in the future: he yet remains on this
account exposed to an eternal wavering, to an influence
from without which ever disturbs him, until he once for
all makes a resolution to declare that is right which is
suitable to himself (Vol. 2, p. 78).
By choosing to determine for himself that which had value and meaning in
experience, Goethe refused to succumb to the forces of external determi
nants.

He demanded instead a willful validation of whatever was neces

sary for his self-enhancement.
biography comes this comment:

From the tenth chapter of the Auto
"I knew how to value highly everything

that contributed to my own cultivation [Bildung]" (Goethe 1969, Vol. 2,
p. 16).

That Goethe was aware of the potentiality for learning and

growth in the relationships he chose to establish is evident.
enabled him to actualize this potentiality?

But what

Once again, it is Gnothe

(1969; himself who hints at the answer and provides the following clues
in the seventh chapter of his Autobiography:
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And thus began that tendency from which I could not deviate
my whole life through; namely, the tendency to turn into an
image, into a poem, everything that delighted or troubled
me, or otherwise occupied me, and to come to some certain
understanding with myself upon it, that I might both rectify
my conceptions of external things, and set my mind at rest
about them (Vol. 1, p. 305).
Goethe had to determine a relationship with whatever he confronted.

He

had to experience in order to find meaning so that self-improvement and
self-understanding would continue.

Once the self determined the value

of a relationship and then proceeded to internalize that value, it was
ready for another confrontation.
applicative process at work.

There was both an evaluative and an

Peterson (1977c) identifies this pivotal

agency as the human will and insists that "to will is to determine the
value and application of the learning objects' roeaningfulness" (p. 47).
As the will validates the object of confrontation, it establishes for
itself what is of value.
object's potentiality.

To realize a value is to have actualized the
The will determines that which has meaning for

the self but also applies this meaning in determining what the object
of confrontation itself can come to be.

In other words, the will pro

vides the self with the ability to apply that which it has learned.
Peterson (1977c) describes this action and explains:
In every object resides learning potentiality; that is, a
potentiality to determine what the object is, but also,
what it can become when the created mind now becomes a
creator, bringing into being new relationships, and,
therefore, new being.
It is the morality of a knowing
which comes from learning the meaning of cause (p. 53).
By applying what it has learned through relationships, the se1f . as a
self-determiner, achieves growth.

Goethe's entire philosophy of knowl

edge thus comes full circle by way of morality and the moral principle
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Findings
Having isolated the constructs of Goethe's epistemology from the
novel Werther, and having examined their content end meaning in terms of
a totality, it is appropriate to return now to the novel and complete
Goethe's philosophy of learning.

Lehrs (1951), is a discussion concern

ing Goethe and mankind, makes the following comment:
He [man] is not only fitted . . . with a once-for-all given
mode of spiritual-physical existence peculiar to himself,
but . . . he is endowed with the possibility cf transit i.-..
ing his existence bv dipt r his free will— that indeed his
manhood
ased on this capacity for self-willed Becoming
(p. 364).
To will to become is for the self to transcend itself.

It is for the

self to take control, to find meaning in relationships, and to know
what it possesses and what it requires.

It is to realize the meaning-

fulness of the potentiality of whatever the self confronts.

Peterson

(1970) describes the process of becoming as follows:
It is a unique process, allowing the individual to transcend
the self, take a look at the self and then decide, by means
of his choices, how to actualize his potential. To do this
requires the whole being; becoming involves the total self.
To do this means that as he gathers new facts about himself,
they should have only one implicative value, namely, to open
new channels of communication with the self in order to
envision his own potentiality (p. 19).
Werther tried to transcend both self and world at every available oppor
tunity throughout the entire development of the novel.

This notion was

apparent to Lange (1952), editor of a collection of German short novels
and stories, who wrote, "His whole existence is a desperate struggle to
transcend life itself and he desires nothing more than to communicate
his extreme state of mind" (p. xi).
Werther himself exclaims:

In the letter of August 18,

/71,

Oh, the times when I longed to fly on the crane's wings, as
it passed overhead to the shores of the illimitable ocean,
in order to drink from the foaming cup of the Infinite an
elating sensation of life, and to feel, if only for a
moment, in the cramped forces of my being one drop of thbliss of that Being who creates everything in and t!.. gn
Himself (Goethe 1971, p. 65).
But transcendence is merelv
from himself.

n
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,s

for Werther by which he can escape

Just before the "editor" must assume the narration of

events, Werther expresses his sentiments in the letter to Wilhelm dated
December 6, 1772.

He protests:

What is maxi, that celebrated demigod! Does he not. lack
powers just when he needs them most? And when he soars
with joy, or sinks into suffering, is he not in both
cases held back and restored to dull, cold conscious
ness at the very moment when he longs to lose himself
in the fullness of the Infinite? (Goethe 1971, pp. 124125).
Werther was unsuccessful in his attempt at transcendence because the
nature of the relationships in which he participated were not charac
terized by the element of self-determination.

Transcendence is achieved

only when the self assumes the quality of honesty and subsequently rises
above the limitations that it may choose to impose upon itself.

It is

through this process that the potentiality of the human will is realized.
In negating the positive functioning of the will

by means of the process

of rationalization, Werther denied the dynamic structure of growth resi
dent in the transcendent factor.

If the self is lost, death is imminent.

Closs (1949), in an essay on Goethe and Kierkegaard, expressed the view
that "life, not death, was his [Goethe's] deep concern; by life he meant
creative activity, not a vegetative existence" (p. 266).

Creativity

implies growth and growth is the only means for self-transcendence.
sufferings of Werther in failing to recognize this principle validate
the essence of Goethe's epistemology.

The

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Principles of Learning Theory
Six educational principles have evolved from Goethe's epistemo
logical premises as they we^e examined within the context of the novel.
Each principle of learning will first be identified and then followed
by a survey of pertinent educational literature.

After all of the six

principles of education have been introduced and discussed, their sig
nificance as a totality for learning theory will be considered.
1.

A primary educational principle derived from this study

insists that the subject matter of education is man.

The emphasis

must be placed on the nature of man and his characteristics as a self
determiner.

Maritain (1943/1968) admits that "education needs primar

ily to know what man i£, what is the nature of man and the scale of
values it essentially involves." (p. 5).

The individuality of the

learner, then, assumes especial attention.

Ortega (.1944/1966), in

retrospect, makes the following declaration:
In education there are three elemental factors: what is
taught (knowledge, wisc.om), and the teacher and learner.
Yet with peculiar blindness, education had centered about
knowledge and the teacher.
The learner was no factor in
pedagogy. . . . It is the learner and his characteristics
which alone can guide us in our effort to make something
organic of education (p. 46).
Eaton (1934), in his essay on Goethe’s meaning for education, writes
that Goethe conceived education as "a being, a growing, a developing
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of individuality through adaptation to nature, accepting, discarding,
but never reaching a definite conclusion" (p. 149).

According to Eaton

(1934), Goethe fully acknowledged throughout his life, "the corner stone
of his educational ideas, the free development of individuality" (p. 154).
Man and his individuality are inseparable from the recognition of the
value man places on his self.

The next principle of learning expresses

this realization.
2.

Because the self is always in relationship to the self, the

intellective process can be understood only in terms of the self in
relationship to the self.
of each distinct self.

This implies that learning is an experience

Hill (1973) asserts that "the self . . .

is a

choosing being, and its choices reflect not merely the objective evi
dence of reason but the subjective passion of existence" (p. 265).

In

his discussion of epistemology, Marler (1975) recognizes the person who
"emphasizes the inescapably personal nature of experience in which our
choices define and reveal the self" (p. 116).

Marler (1975) continues

and states, "His choices, in turn, will indicate what knowledge he has
taken unto himself— they will determine what he will become" (p. 135).
John Dewey was aware of the impact that such interaction between the
learner and the object of confrontation would have for education.
Dewey (1938/1968) insisted that "the beginning of instruction shall be
made with the experience learners already have; that this experience
and the capacities that have been developed during its course pro
vide the starting point for all further learning" (p. 74).

Learning

becomes an extremely personal matter from the standpoint of the self.
As Brubacher (1969) suggests, in reference to epistemological theory

S4
and its application to method, "learning is a profound personal experi
ence, a self-actualizing, a coming to know oneself by his own efforts.
One learns, gets to know, what one is" (p. 222).

In order for the self

to establish sucn an educative relationship to itself, it must first
exist as a unity and function as a totality.

Maritain (1943/1968)

observes that, "the whole work of education and teaching must tend to
unify, not to spread out; it must strive to foster internal unity in
man" (p. 45).

Goethe himself recognized this requirement for unity if

the self was to fulfill its obligation as a self-determiner.

The fol

lowing paragraph was written to an acquaintance of Goethe's (Schubarth)
and dated July 8, 1818;
It is a matter of indifference in what circle we begin our
work of self-cultivation, it is all the same from which
point we orient the progress of our Bildung, provided there
is a circle and there is a point of departure. To acquire
a productive Bildung that proceeds from a nucleus should be
a young man's concern; and even in advancing years, when
our development broadens out along historical lines, we
must compress the diffusion of our interests and recapture
the sense of unity (Goethe 1949, p. 153).
Goethe astutely discusses this notion of unity in conjunction with selfcultivation.

The manner in which the self comes to know and legitimize

its knowledge becomes the substance of the third learning principle.
3.

In order to learn and to know, the self must determine the

validity and reliability of that which it seeks to k m w

(confront).

Eaton (1934) attests to this principle when he declares that "the chief
source of Goethe's educational Ideas would seem to have been his pas
sionate desire for self-culture and his view of man's goal" (p. 146).
That an individual chooses to educate himself and can actually proceed
to bring it about is of great significance.

Maritain (1943/1968)
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believes that "from the very start the teacher must respect in the child
the dignity of the mind, must appeal to the child's power of understand
ing, and conceive of his own effort as preparing a human mind to think
for itself" (p. 26).

That the nature o! the self is affected by the

choices made through the intellective process is apparent to Hutchins.
Hutchins (1936/1962) proposes that "since character is the result of
choice it is difficult to see how you can develop it; unless you train
the mind to make intelligent choices" (p. 29).

In order to make

choices, value and meaning must be determined by the self.

Hook (1946/

1967) enunciates this view when he writes that educational institutions
"must strengthen the powers of independent reflection, which will enable
students to confront the claims of ideals and values by their alterna
tives" (p. 145).

In other words, the self must validate that which it

acts upon if it is to counter the demands of the process of rationali
zation.

Scheffler (1965/1971), in discussing aspects of St. Augustine's

theory of teaching, provides the following comment:
The pupil who knows, Augustine seems to say, is not just
someone who has a belief which is true, even if he has the
belief on the highest authority (he uses Biblical examples).
He. must further have considered within himself whether what
has been said is true. He must have engaged in a personal
process of evaluating the belief in question. . . . It serves
to distinguish genuine knowing from mere true belief, by
reference to appropriate evaluation of the belief by the
believer: The surplus strength of knowing consists, in
short, in the knower's having adequate evidence for the
belief in question (p. 316).
What is being suggested is that the self is provided with the empirical
mechanism for instructing itself and subsequently determining the valid
ity and reliability of this knowledge.

Peterson (1970) calls for the

creative teacher "to enable each student to become his own teacher"

86

(p. 43).

This demand is consistent with his conviction that "the aim

of all knowledge is to permit the learner to find self-fulfillment"
(Peterson 1970, p. 51).

If the self becomes its own teacher, then the

learning act can indeed be identified as a process of self-examination.
The origin, or source, of this self-initiated activity must now be con
sidered and disclosed through an assessment of the fourth principle of
learning theory,
4,

Thinking requires the interrogative mode of the intellec

This means that to receive knowledge is not nearly as important to the
self as is the exertion of its own inherent potentiality for knowing
and learning.

Brubacher (1977) is in agreement and declares that

"acquiring knowledge, hence, is incidental to inquiring into knowl
edge." (p. 96).

In order to inquire into an object, however, the self

must actively confront the object.

Dewey (1938/1968) elucidates this

matter by suggesting that "problems are the stimulus to thinking"
(p. 79).

He further explains as follows:

Growth depends upon the presence of difficulty to be overcome
by the exercise of intelligence.
Once more, it is part of
the educator's responsibility to see equally to two things:
First, that the problem grows out of the conditions of the
experience being had in the present, and that it is within
the range of the capacity of students; and, secondly, that
it is such that it arouses in the learner an active quest
for information and for production of new ideas. The new
facts and new ideas thus obtained become the ground for fur
ther experiences in which new problems are presented (Dewey
1938/1968, p. 79).
Dewey Is placing the emphasis upon the learner.

It is the self that must

be internally, or intrinsically, motivated to continually seek for knowl
edge and its truth.

It is a self which is confronting objects in order

to determine value and realize meaning.

As Dewey (1938/1968) indicates,
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"The most important attitude that can be found is that of desire to go
on learning" (p. 48).
to fulfill.

The self must be aware of a need which it strives

Only through recognizing that the self possesses an inner

vitality of its own is such a conception possible.

Since the self does

in fact move upon that which it seeks to know by means of the will, the
next educational principle examines the consequences of this activity.
5.

Because man is always in relation to that which confronts

him as a determiner, all learning is creative.

Peterson (1970)

expresses his concurrence and states the following:
The learner must possess the ability to create; the patterns
of education serve no other purpose than providing the spiri
tual incentive for using what has been learned. To create
anew out of how and what he has learned is an important goal
of every learner (p. 45).
Learning becomes the main ingredient for further learning.

In the

process of this learning is seen the potential for creating that which
the self is to become.

Ortega (1944/1966) stresses that "our life is

not given to us ready-made:

in a fundamental sense it is, precisely,

what we are constantly and continuously making of ourselves.
process is going on at every instant" (p. 17).

The

This dynamic sense of

creativity implies an educational development that sees as its aim,
to borrow a phrase from Strain (1971) in his discussion of contemporary
educational philosophers, "the becoming of a human person, a person who
lives and makes decisions about what he will do and be" (pp. 473-474).
But to be a self-determiner and to create is more than just making
decisions.
sions.

It is accepting the responsibility inherent in those deci

This is what Hook (1946/1967) demands when he replies that "it

['moral' education] is found wherever knowledge is so taught that it
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heightens the sense of human responsibility for the inescapable deci
sions which men must make" (p. 160).

The learner is a creator and must

accept the responsibility for the choices made and their implications.
As Peterson (1970) notes, "The learner is always the active participant
in the learning process" (p. 10).
learning theory.

This is the applicative dimension in

It is the learner beginning to actualize his choices

through application of their meanings.

To understand the method by

which this self-realization interacts and communicates with other
selves is the function of the sixth principle of learning,
6.

A relationship which demands and insists upon a deep degree

of mutuality is a learning process.

Hill (1973) acknowledges this prin

ciple when he declares that "good purposes are defined as those which
promote communion between selves, fostering creativity on behalf of
such communion" (p. 266).

This too is an application of knowledge in

quest of meaning, but it occurs within a social context.
8

It is the

establishment of a relationship between selves in order to realize a
potentiality that was previously nonexistent and which goes beyond
whatever each self could accomplish in isolation.
this notion of dialogue and intercommunication.

Dewey considers
He writes, "The prin

ciple that development of experience comes about through interaction
means that education is essentially a social process" (Dewey 1938/1968,
p. 58).

Hutchins Q936/1962) affirms the social nature of man but

laments the virtual absence in the modern world of "any intelligible
basis for the study of man in his relations with other men" (p. 99).
If man is a self-determiner, then, it is his nature to constantly make
choices.

Hill (1973) recognizes this characteristic of man and asserts
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that "creativity and dialogue are the channels through which his choices
are actualized" (p. 270).

As the self creates through its own process

of determination, it must certainly be affected by the creative activity
of other selves.

Peterson (1970) perceives this interactive influence

and suggests the following:
There is a dual focus, one beam emphasizing the individual
and what he can make of himself through finding the meaning
of life (for himself and the good of society), and the other
emphasizing the resultant society and what it can mean for
the individual (p. 13).
This is the mutuality inherent within the nature of a creative relation
ship in which experience is shared between two selves.

It is the dia

logue, the reciprocal interaction, the meeting of ideas, the compari
sons, the weighing and the evaluation of all that the self allows to
confront it.

In this manner, the self can determine its own nature

and yet be an integral part of the growth and experience of other
selves.

Implications and Applications of
the Principles of Learning Theory
Now that each of the six principles of learning have been iden
tified and considered individually, it remains to determine what their
implication for education is if they are conceived in terms of a total
and unified philosophical framework.
offers the following conclusion:

At this juncture Peterson (1970)

"In a sense, education demands more

than any one teacher can give; but, to find and give direction will
always remain his primary task" (p. 43).

It remains to delineate the

nature of this direction, but Kill provides an invaluable insight.
He suggests the following:
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Culture and education are most concerned with the spiritual
or distinctively human. . . . By proposing that educational
theorizing should focus on the spiritual, 1 have implied that
the desired educational outcome will be a self which is con
sciously concerned with the problem of making consistently
good choices (Hill 1973, p. 270).
The approach of both Peterson and Hill is applicable to learning theory
as derived from the six educational principles.

Furthermore, a syn

thesis of their ideas is set forth by Wynne in his introductory remarks
to Petersen's Existentialism and the Creative Teacher.

Wynne (1970)

maintains the following:
Education will actively provide to the person the direction
needed and then permit the individual the right to choose.
It will place the decision-making emphasis on the individual;
it will offer freedom of choice; it will demand that the per
son who so commits himself takes the responsibility for this
action. This freedom of choice is then not license; it is
rather a demand for effectual commitment, commitment in the
light of a value system that has been developed in a setting
of self-determination and an awareness of the "other" (pp,
viii-ix).
In order to actualize the implications that are resident in such a con
ception of education, there must be a consistent application of the
principles of learning theory in harmony with this notion of freedom
of choice.
To realize the full potentiality inherent in a learning theory
derived from these six principles of education requires an educational
process that is humanistically oriented.

A humanistic education is one

which insists that the subject matter of education is the nature of man
and his characteristics as a self-determiner.

It will be a process that

provides each self with the means for attaining the aim, or purpose, of
education; that is, growth and self-enhancement.

To learn, to know,

and to subsequently evaluate the validity of this knowledge will provide
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the self with the motivation and vitality necessary in its unceasing
pursuit of truth.

An important aspect of investigating and determin

ing the nature of truth is that sense of total self-awareness which
is constantly striven for.

Only when the self is in such a mode does

it begin to understand the intellective process.
requires the interrogative state of mind.

To be able to think

It is the perpetual quest

for knowledge and purpose as conveyed through the word why.

It is the

ability of the self to reason and to develop intellectually.

It is

freeing the individual from biases, prejudices, and the discrete survey of opinion.

Through dialogue and the mutuality of relationships,

a humanistic education provides the freedom to allow the individual to
look at ideas.

It is the freedom to choose as well as the responsibil

ity to discriminate among alternative possibilities of choice.

In order

to function properly, the self must make a good choice which presupposes
the necessity to know.

In order to know the good it is essential to

think and to be conscious of the process of thinking.

Inherently

residing within each self is the responsibility to learn, to know, to
interact, to experience, to grow.

A humanistically educated individual

ought to manifest and exemplify each of these qualities.
The search for truth becomes one of the cornerstones in the con
struction of a humanistic theory of learning.
ability to think.

It, too, is based on the

Without the quintessential ingredient of cognition,

there can be no formulation of propositions and concepts and no testing,
review, restructuring, or reverification of hypotheses and premises.
other words, self-examination would not be possible.

In

A major presupposi

tion of truth is its legitimacy and validity which implies the process

92

of thought.

Consequently, the self is confronted with the need to dis

criminate among a multitude of possible choices.

By means of a humanis

tic education, the structuring and subsequent validation and verifica
tion of hypotheses ought to be facilitated and enhanced.
this development should culminate in an individual

j

As a resu.1 ,

is aware of cer

tain insights that are basically related to the universal element of
choice.

This knowledge and recognition of the freedom of choice ought

to lead to the actualization of the individual's potentiality and to a
continued sense of self-fulfillment.
Having acknowledged the fundamental relationship between freedom
of choice and a learning theory structured from humanistic components,
a significant factor remains.

It is the recognition that not only must

choice be consistent with the determination made by the self, but it
should also be cognizant of the existing social context.

What is being

suggested is the notion of ideas and actions occurring within a social
medium.

It is the applicative dimension of a humanistic educational

philosophy which is legitimized through a cycle of continuous evalua
tion.

Within contemporary society, there exists a need to Identify why

people within the collective structure of the community think and act
the way they do.

A humanistic education ought to provide the ability

to analyze, evaluate, validate, and respond to changing circumstances
within society.

Furthermore, the ability should exist to determine the

true nature of change in order that it may be utilized for the benefit
of society.

People must not be taught or trained merely to habituate

themselves to conditions.

Rather than unconsciously reacting to stimuli,

the self must first ask why such a response is being made.

In other
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words, the individual must learn to think and evaluate for himself.

It

becomes important, therefore, to focus on and understand the process
involved in achieving, coping with, responding to, and utilizing change.
A humanistically educated individual ought, then, to be able to recognize
not only his own needs but those of the society in which he lives and to
discern the attitudes and expectations of the community.

The consequent

logicality of approaching and confronting reality through the social con
text of interrelationships seems apparent enough.

Society also requires

the maintenance of a mutual base of common discourse and shared values
in order to continue existing, growing, and improving life for its mem
bers.

A humanistically based learning theory can lend itself to explor

ing these shared values and in establishing a common understanding about
mankind.

In essence, this capability to communicate is one of the vital

facets of a humanistic education.
It is now appropriate to draw attention to the pivotal role
that a humanistic education can play within the multiplicity of dis
ciplines and cognitive systems in order to prepare the self for con
tinued learning.

It is the opportunity to enhance the mind's ability

to conceptualize (to become conscious of what is revealed by knowledge),
to perceive and identify the relationships among a multitude of partic
ulars, and to subsequently grasp the underlying similarities and gener
alities.

A type of interdisciplinary approach is envisioned which

recognizes a common framework.

That there might well exist a certain

commonality or set of presuppositions upon which the various kinds of
knowledge could structure themselves is a significant and intriguing
proposal.

By positing a foundation that serves as the unifying element
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in the totality of all the forms of knowledge, it becomes reasonable to
always assume relationships rather than presuppose their absence..
A humanistically oriented process of learning, then, is infused
with purpose and constantly validated through an evaluative process.

It

is an education applied within a dynamic, grox-zing, and ever changing
social milieu.
education.

A humanistic education thus becomes a sort of self-

It contributes to the individual's understanding of himself

in connection with the mutuality of his relationships and the complex
ity of interrelationships that constitute the reality of the world.

To

interact with these relationships, to undergo their consequences, to
experience, and to grow* is to have acknowledged the vitality and per
petuity of the self-determinative potentiality inherent in mankind.

Conclusions
To recapitulate the educational core of Goethe's epistemology
will underscore its applicability to a humanistic philosophy of learn
ing.
1.

Goethe realized that the subject matter of education is

man, and he emphasized the nature of man and his characteristics as
a self-determiner.

The focus of education must therefore center upon

the learner and his individuality.
2.

Because the self is a unity and functions as a totality,

learning becomes an experience of each distinct, or unique, self.
Being a composite of the effects of its choices, the self perceives
learning as an extremely personal matter.

This means that education

must recognize the value that man places on his self in his demand
for self-cultivation.
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3.

Goethe knew that the self can choose to educate, itself and

actually proceed to bring this process about.

Through determining the

validity and reliability of that which it seeks to know, the learner is
provided with an empirical base from which to begin his instruction.
In this manner, the self becomes its ox\rn teacher and the learning act
is identified as a process of self-examination.
4.

It is the self that exerts its own inherent potentiality for

knowing and learning.

Goethe recognized the internal, or intrinsic,

motivation of the self to seek knowledge and truth, and he demanded that
the self actively confront its learning object.

Education must acknowl

edge that the learner does indeed possess an inner vitality of his own.
5.

Man is always in relation to that which confronts him as a

determiner.

All learning is creative because the learner is the creator

of further learning.

In his role as creator, the learner makes a multi“I

\

tude of decisions and must subsequently accept the inherent responsibil
ity for the choices made and their implications.

Goethe was fully aware

that in actualizing its choices through application of their meanings,
the self becomes an active agent in the process of learning.
6.

In order to actively participate in the educational process,

the learner must understand the social nature of man.

A relationship of

mutuality, based on dialogue and intercommunication, is a learning
process.

This process of learning is the application of knowledge in

quest of meaning in a social context.
creative activity of other selves.

The self is affected by the

Experience shared between two

selves, as Goetne realized, means that the learner can determine his
own nature and yet be an integral part of the growth and experience
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of other selves.

These relationships with other selves are actually

learning processes.
Pivotal to Goethe's epistemology was his ax<rareness that the
relationships he participated in with others were totally dependent
on the nature of the relationship he had with himself.

The focal

point, said Goethe, is man and how he comes to know himself through
the relationships he establishes in life.

As a true humanistic edu

cator and philosopher, Goethe asked man to recognize and understand
himself in order that he might be able to assume, the responsibilities
of self-examination and self-determination.
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